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Death by Stereotype: Race, Ethnicity, and California’s  
Failure to Implement Furman’s Narrowing Requirement 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The influence of race on the administration of capital punishment in the United 
States had a major role in the United States Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Furman v. 
Georgia to invalidate death penalty statutes across the United States.  To avoid 
discriminatory and capricious application of capital punishment, the Supreme Court held 
that the Eighth Amendment requires legislatures to narrow the scope of capital offenses 
and ensure that only the most severe crimes are subjected to the ultimate punishment.  
This Article demonstrates the racial and ethnic dimension of California’s failure to 
implement this narrowing requirement.  Our analysis uses a sample of 1,900 cases drawn 
from 27,453 California convictions for first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and 
voluntary manslaughter with offense dates between January 1978 and June 2002.  
Contrary to the teachings of Furman, we found that several of California’s “special 
circumstances” target capital eligibility disparately based on the race or ethnicity of the 
defendant.  In so doing, the statute appears to codify rather than ameliorate the harmful 
racial stereotypes that are endemic to our criminal justice system.  The instantiation of 
racial and ethnic stereotypes into death-eligibility raises the specter of discriminatory 
intent in the design of California’s statute, with implications for constitutional regulation 
of capital punishment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article examines the possible race and ethnic implications of California’s 
expansive death penalty statute, in light of the Eighth Amendment’s requirement that 
each state statute narrows the subclass of offenders upon whom a sentence of death may 
be imposed.  The narrowing requirement derives from the holding announced over 45 
years ago in Furman v. Georgia,1 when the United States Supreme Court ruled that 
existing death penalty statutes violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishments.  Citing statistics demonstrating arbitrary and capricious 
application of capital punishment, the Supreme Court held that a death-sentencing 
procedure is unconstitutional if it provides “no meaningful basis for distinguishing the 
few cases in which [death] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.”2   
Four years later, in Gregg v. Georgia, and the companion cases, the Supreme 
Court reviewed the subsequently enacted statutes.3  In upholding some of the statutes, the 
Court in a plurality opinion explained, “Furman mandates that where discretion is 
afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human 
life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as 
to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.”4  Thus, “[t]o pass 
constitutional muster, a capital sentencing statute must ‘genuinely narrow the class of 
                                                          
1  408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
2  Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring); see also Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362 (1988); 
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427-28 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
3  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1972); Proffitt v. Florida, 
428 U.S. 242 (1976). 
4  Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (plurality opinion) see also Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983) 
(explaining that the purpose of the narrowing requirement is to insure “that discretion must be suitably 
directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action”).  The Court 
invalidated statutes that require the mandatory imposition of a death sentence precisely because they do not 
permit individualized sentencing decisions.  Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).    
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persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a 
more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.’”5  
Importantly, the Court has required that the requisite direction and limitation be provided 
by statute, so that the selection of the persons eligible to be sentenced to death be 
“circumscribed by . . . legislative guidelines.”6  This constitutional guidance was 
designed to limit the discretion of individual prosecutors to charge capital defendants and 
sentencers to impose death sentences. 
In previous research, we presented empirical findings regarding California’s death 
penalty scheme.7  We found that the scope of death eligibility under California law 
following the decision in Furman was quite expansive:  95% of first-degree murder 
convictions qualify under the 2008 California statute as eligible for a death sentence.8  
We also found that that only a fraction of those eligible for a death sentence were actually 
sentenced to death:  Only 4.6% of those persons who have committed a factually eligible 
capital murder were sentenced to death, a rate that is far lower than the 15-20 percent rate 
                                                          
5  Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988) (quoting Zant, 462 U.S. at 877). 
6  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 207 (emphasis added); see also Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 
216, & n. 2 (2006) (“To satisfy the ‘narrowing requirement,’ a state legislature must adopt ‘statutory 
factors which determine death eligibility’ and thereby ‘limit the class of murderers to which the death 
penalty may be applied.’”) (emphasis added).   
7  David Baldus, George Woodworth, Michael Laurence, Jeffrey Fagan, Catherine Grosso, & 
Richard Newell, Furman at 45: Constitutional Challenges from California’s Failure to (Again) Narrow 
Death Eligibility [“Furman at 45”] (under review, available from authors on request).  These findings 
previously were submitted on behalf of two California death row inmates who have challenged the 
constitutionality of the death sentences in part because of the failure of the California statute to satisfy the 
narrowing requirements of Furman.  The inmates, Jerry Frye and Troy Ashmus, are challenging their 
convictions and death sentences in federal habeas corpus proceedings.  Frye v. Warden, Case No. 2:99-cv-
0628 (E.D. Cal.); Ashmus v. Wong, Case No. 93-cv-0594 (N.D. Cal.). 
8  We also found a death-eligibility rate of 59% for those convicted of first-degree and second-
degree murder and voluntary manslaughter and that 86% of the factually first degree murder cases are 
death eligible.  Furman at 45, supra note 7. 
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that the Furman Court viewed as evidence of arbitrariness.9  
This Article builds on that foundation and shows that, contrary to the teachings of 
Furman, six of California’s “special circumstances” target capital eligibility based on the 
race or ethnicity of the defendant.  In so doing, the statute appears to codify rather than 
ameliorate the harmful racial stereotypes that are endemic to our criminal justice 
system.10 
Part II presents a closer look at Furman v. Georgia and the jurisprudence around 
race and capital punishment.  Part III examines California’s capital punishment statutes 
with special attention to the state’s response to the Eighth Amendment narrowing 
requirements.  Part IV turns to the academic literature studying Furman’s mandates, 
before reviewing, in brief, ways in which race and ethnicity have been central to the 
administration of capital punishment in the United States.  Part V explains the details of 
our empirical study, including coding decisions and challenges.  Part VI presents our 
findings, demonstrating that six of California’s special circumstances apply disparately 
based on race and ethnicity.  Finally, in Part VII, we discuss the importance of these 
findings in light of Furman’s goals and requirements. 
 
                                                          
9  The evidence before the Court in Furman was that “15% to 20% of those convicted of murder are 
sentenced to death in States where it is authorized.”  Furman, 408 U.S. at 386-87 n.11 (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting); id. at 435-36 n.19 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing Hugo Bedau, Death Sentences in New Jersey 
1907-1960, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1964) (“[B]etween 1916 and 1955, 157 out of 652 persons charged 
with murder received the death sentence in New Jersey—about 20%; between 1956 and 1960, 13 out of 61 
received the death sentence—also about 20%.”)).   
10  April D. Fernandes & Robert D. Crutchfield, Race, Crime, and Criminal Justice: Fifty Years Since 
The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, 17 CRIM. & PUBLIC POL’Y 397 (2018).  See generally THE 
COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND CRIME IN AMERICA (Samuel Walker, Cassia Spohn, & Miriam 
DeLone eds., 2012). 
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II. FURMAN, RACE, AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
In Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court reviewed the application of capital 
punishment in the United States and held that the then-current death penalty statutes 
violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment proscriptions against cruel and unusual 
punishment.11  The opinions of several Justices concurring in the judgment concluded 
that statutes that allowed the infrequent and seemingly random imposition of the death 
penalty upon only a small percentage of death-eligible criminal defendants violated the 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments because they permitted the death 
penalty “to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.”12   
Furman and its progeny made clear that the Eighth Amendment demands that 
legislatures set forth standards and criteria to regulate its state capital sentencing system 
to avoid an unconstitutional pattern of arbitrary and capricious sentences.13  At a 
minimum, to “avoid [the] constitutional flaw” of arbitrary and capricious imposition of 
the death penalty, state death penalty statutes, by rational and objective criteria, “must 
genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably 
justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others 
found guilty of murder.”14   
Of concern to several of the Justices in the Furman Majority were suggestions 
that death sentences impermissibly were influenced by race.  Justice William Douglas 
                                                          
11  408 U.S. at 239 (per curiam). 
12  Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring), 313 (White, J., concurring).   
13  See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“Furman mandates that 
where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a 
human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to 
minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.”).   
14  Zant, 462 U.S. at 877; see also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (stating the mandate of Furman).   
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cited racial disparities as a basis for striking down the statutes.15  Justice Potter Stewart 
similarly concluded that “if any basis can be discerned for the selection of these few to be 
sentenced to die, it is the constitutionally impermissible basis of race.”16  Justice Marshall 
noted that racial disparities were still prevalent at the time of Furman, but acknowledged 
that the insufficient record before the Court and the Court’s prior decision in Maxwell v. 
Bishop17 prevented a finding that racial bias infected all death sentences imposed on non-
white defendants.18 
Four years after Furman, the United States Supreme Court reviewed state death 
penalty statutes enacted in an attempt to cure the constitutional deficiencies.19  In Gregg 
v. Georgia, the Supreme Court recognized the relevant statistics relied upon in Furman, 
and reiterated the constitutional rule that legislatures must distinguish “the few cases in 
which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.’”20  The 
Court in Gregg upheld the revised Georgia statute, finding that it adequately “narrow[ed] 
the class of murderers subject to capital punishment by specifying 10 statutory 
aggravating circumstances,” which channeled the jury’s discretion and protected against 
                                                          
15  408 U.S. at 245.  Justice Douglas cited a host of statistical analysis finding that race had a 
significant role in the imposition of death sentences.  See, e.g., id. at 249-50 (quoting the 1967 President’s 
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, which found that  “The death sentence 
is disproportionately imposed, and carried out on the poor, the Negro, and the members of unpopular 
groups.”); id. at 250 n.15 (quoting Professor Hugo Bedau’s conclusion that “Although there may be a host 
of factors other than race involved in this frequency distribution, something more than chance has operated 
over the years to produce this racial difference”); id. (citing Professor Marvin Wolfgang and his colleagues’ 
findings that racial basis affected the sentencing and execution of defendants in 439 death cases from 1914-
1958). 
16  Id. at 310. 
17  398 U.S. 262 (1970). 
18  408 U.S. at 449. 
19  Gregg, 428 U.S. 153; Jurek, 428 U.S. 262; Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242. 
20  428 U.S. at 182 n.26; id. at 188 (citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring)). 
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“a jury wantonly and freakishly impos[ing] the death sentence; [in that] it is always 
circumscribed by the legislative guidelines.”21   
In his concurrence in Gregg, Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and 
Justice Rehnquist, explained the rationale for requiring statutory narrowing and how an 
adequately narrowed statute objectively circumscribing the pool of death-eligible 
offenders would be expected to operate: 
As the types of murders for which the death penalty may be imposed 
become more narrowly defined and are limited to those which are 
particularly serious or for which the death penalty is peculiarly appropriate 
. . . it becomes reasonable to expect that juries even given discretion not to 
impose the death penalty will impose the death penalty in a substantial 
portion of the cases so defined.  If they do, it can no longer be said that the 
penalty is being imposed wantonly and freakishly or so infrequently that it 
loses its usefulness as a sentencing device.  There is, therefore, reason to 
expect that Georgia’s current system would escape the infirmities which 
invalidated its previous system under Furman.22   
Thus, the Supreme Court relies upon the Eighth Amendment’s narrowing principle to 
assure that the selection of the smaller group of persons actually sentenced to death from 
among the larger group of persons who could have been so sentenced is regulated by 
legislatively prescribed criteria of sufficient certainty to guard against arbitrariness and 
caprice.23 
In 1987, in McCleskey v. Kemp, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the 
                                                          
21  Id. at 196-97, 207.   
22  Id. at 222 (White, J., concurring); cf. Zant, 462 U.S. at 878 (“Our cases indicate, then, that 
statutory aggravating circumstances play a constitutionally necessary function at the stage of legislative 
definition:  they circumscribe the class of persons eligible for the death penalty.”).   
23  Chelsea Creo Sharon, The “Most Deserving” of Death: The Narrowing Requirement and the 
Proliferation of Aggravating Factors in Capital Sentencing Statutes, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 223, 247 
(2011) (“The narrowing requirement’s primary aim is to reduce arbitrariness by confining the discretion of 
jurors and prosecutors to a particularly heinous group of offenders, making it more likely that culpability 
rather than caprice will drive their decision making.”). 
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application of the Georgia death penalty statute in light of statistical evidence that 
Georgia death sentences were impermissibly influenced by racial considerations.24  The 
Court reaffirmed the holding in Furman that the Eighth Amendment is violated where 
“the death penalty [is] so irrationally imposed that any particular death sentence could be 
presumed excessive [and] . . . there was no basis for determining in any particular case 
whether the penalty was proportionate to the crime.”25  Similarly, a “capital punishment 
system [that] operates in an arbitrary and capricious manner,” violates the Constitution.26   
The Court began its Eighth Amendment analysis of Mr. McCleskey’s statistical 
evidence by reviewing the procedural safeguards adopted by the Georgia Legislature to 
avoid such unconstitutional results.27  The Court found that “[n]umerous features of the 
then new Georgia statute met the concerns articulated in Furman,” including provisions 
in the statute that “narrow[] the class of murders subject to the death penalty.”28  As a 
result of these protections, the Court “lawfully may presume that McCleskey’s death 
sentence was not ‘wantonly and freakishly’ imposed, and thus that the sentence is not 
                                                          
24  481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
25  Id. at 301. 
26  Id. at 306. 
27  The statistical analysis, conducted by Professors David C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski, and George 
Woodworth, examined over 2,000 murder cases that occurred in Georgia during the 1970s.  The Court 
summarized the findings as follows:   
Baldus subjected his data to an extensive analysis, taking account of 230 variables that 
could have explained the disparities on nonracial grounds.  One of his models concludes 
that, even after taking account of 39 nonracial variables, defendants charged with killing 
white victims . . . [faced] 4.3 times [the odds of] . . . receiv[ing] a death sentence as 
defendants charged with killing blacks.  According to this model, black defendants were 
1.1 times as likely to receive a death sentence as other defendants.  Thus, the Baldus 
study indicates that black defendants, such as McCleskey, who kill white victims have 
the greatest likelihood of receiving the death penalty.  
Id. at 286. 
28  Id. at 302. 
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disproportionate within any recognized meaning under the Eighth Amendment.”29  
Applying this presumption, the Court declined to accept statistical evidence proffered by 
Mr. McCleskey as a “constitutional measure of an unacceptable risk of racial prejudice 
influencing capital sentencing decisions.”30  In the more than 30 years since the 
McCleskey ruling, the Court has rarely visited the question of racial bias in death 
sentencing, in other than narrow holdings to correct case-specific egregious expressions 
of racial animus at trial.31 
 
III.  CALIFORNIA’S RESPONSE TO THE COURT’S EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT PROSCRIPTIONS 
California, like several other states, has chosen to implement the narrowing 
requirement by broadly defining capital offenses and then requiring the sentencer to find 
at least one statutory aggravating factor that makes the defendant’s crime subject to a 
death sentence.32  The California death penalty statute defines death eligibility as the 
commission of a first-degree murder with the presence of one or more enumerated special 
                                                          
29  Id. at 308 (citations omitted). 
30  Id. at 309.  The Court also held that the statistical evidence established an equal protection 
violation: 
For this claim to prevail, McCleskey would have to prove that the Georgia Legislature 
enacted or maintained the death penalty statute because of an anticipated racially 
discriminatory effect.  In Gregg v. Georgia, . . .this Court found that the Georgia capital 
sentencing system could operate in a fair and neutral manner.  There was no evidence 
then, and there is none now, that the Georgia Legislature enacted the capital punishment 
statute to further a racially discriminatory purpose. 
Id. at 298. 
31  See, e.g., Buck v Davis, 580 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 759, 777 (2017) (finding defense counsel 
rendered deficient and prejudicial representation by introducing expert testimony Mr. Buck was statistically 
more likely to act violently in the future because he was Black). 
32  See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code §§ 189, 190.2 (West 2019) (requiring the finding of the presence of an 
enumerated “special circumstance” before a defendant is subject to a capital sentence). 
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circumstances.33  California defines first degree murder as all murder which is 
perpetrated by means of: 
1. A destructive device,  
2. Any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, 
3. Committed in the perpetration of arson, rape, carjacking, robbery, 
burglary, mayhem, kidnapping, train wrecking, torture, sodomy, or one 
of several sex crimes, or  
4. Discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another 
person outside of the vehicle with the intent to inflict death.34 
The development and application of aggravating factors or “special 
circumstances” as they are termed in California, unfolded in several discrete stages to 
create unprecedented levels of death eligibility.35  In 1977, the California Legislature 
enacted a relatively narrow statute that enumerated several murders as capital crimes.36  
A year later, the 1977 statute was replaced with the “Briggs Initiative,” which 
significantly expanded the scope of California’s special circumstances.  The drafters of 
the Briggs Initiative intended for California’s death penalty to apply to “all homicides 
committed while the defendant was engaged in, or was an accomplice in, the commission 
of, the attempted commission of, or the immediate flight after committing or attempting 
to commit serious felonies, as well as all willful and intentional homicides,” including all 
                                                          
33  Cal. Penal Code §§ 189, 190.2 (West 2019). 
34  Cal. Penal Code § 189 (West 2019).  One of the most interesting features of the California statute, 
which in part creates its breadth, is its treatment of premeditation.  “To prove that the killing was 
“deliberate and premeditated,” it shall not be necessary to prove the defendant maturely and meaningfully 
reflected upon the gravity of his or her act.”  Id. § 189(d). 
35  After Furman, the California Legislature enacted a death penalty statute in 1973 that mandated 
imposition of the death penalty for individuals found guilty of first-degree murder when one of ten special 
circumstances were present.  1973 Cal. Stat. c. 719, §§ 1- 5.  In 1976, the California Supreme Court 
invalidated the mandatory statute pursuant to the decision in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 
(1976).  Rockwell v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 420 (1976). 
36  1977-78 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1977).   
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first-degree murders.37  Indeed, the sponsors of the Briggs Initiative promised California 
voters in campaign and ballot materials that the statute would expand the applicability of 
the death penalty to “every murderer.”38  
The Briggs Initiative sought to achieve this result in two ways: first, by more than 
doubling the number of special circumstances delineated in the prior law, and second, by 
substantially broadening the definitions of the prior law’s special circumstances, most 
significantly by eliminating the across-the-board homicide mens rea requirement of the 
1977 law.39  This stage lasted approximately six years. 
Next, an interim stage lasting nearly four years was created by a California 
Supreme Court ruling in Carlos v. Superior Court,40 which held that the felony-murder 
special circumstances required the state to prove that a defendant possessed the intent to 
kill during the commission of the felony.  The “Carlos window,” however, applies only 
to murders committed between December 12, 1983, the date on which Carlos was 
decided, and October 13, 1987, the date on which it was overruled in People v. 
                                                          
37  Declaration of Donald H. Heller, at 1-2, submitted as Exhibit 183, in Ashmus v. Wong, Case No. 
93-cv-0594 (N.D. Cal.) (statement of drafter of Briggs Initiative); see also W.E. Barnes, Sen. Briggs: ‘Your 
Life is in Danger’, S.F. EXAMINER & CHRONICLE, April 2, 1978, at A10. 
38  Declaration of Gerald F. Uelmen, at 7, submitted as Exhibit 33, in Ashmus v. Wong, Case No. 93-
cv-0594 (N.D. Cal.). 
39  See Steven F. Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The California Death Penalty Scheme: Requiem for Furman, 
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1283, 1311-13 (1997); Cal. Penal Code § 190.2 (West 1988).  The 1977 expansion of the 
application of capital punishment in California evoked widespread concern about the constitutionality of 
the Briggs Initiative, even from those involved in its enforcement.  “Members of the law enforcement 
community and those charged with prosecuting offenders of the laws of California expressed constitutional 
concerns about the breath of the proposed initiative, with its expansive list of death-eligible crimes.”  
Declaration of Gerald F. Uelmen, supra note 38, at 7-8. 
40  35 Cal. 3d 131 (1983).  In Carlos, decided on December 12, 1983, the California Supreme Court 
held that the robbery felony-murder special circumstance (Cal. Penal Code. § 190.2(a)(17)(i)) required the 
state to prove that the defendant had the intent to kill or to aid in a killing.  In People v. Anderson, 43 Cal. 
3d 1104 (1987), decided October 13, 1987, the California Supreme Court overruled Carlos, holding that 
intent to kill is not a requirement to find a felony-murder special circumstance for a person who is the 
actual killer.  People v. Musselwhite, 17 Cal. 4th 1216, 1265 (1998) (citations omitted). 
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Anderson.41   
The fourth stage is the post-Carlos period, which continues to the present.  Both 
before and after Carlos, the panoply of special circumstances continued to unfold over 
time in a recurring and cumulative process of ritualized statutory expansion over the 
course of three decades.42  As a result, California Penal Code section 190.2 currently 
contains thirty-two special circumstances that define death eligibility.43   
                                                          
41  43 Cal. 3d 1104 (1987). 
42  See generally Jonathan Simon & Christina Spaulding, Token of Our Esteem: Aggravating Factors 
in the Era of Deregulated Death Penalties, in THE KILLING STATE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN LAW, 
POLITICS AND CULTURE 81 (Austin Sarat, ed. 1999). 
43  Cal. Penal Code § 190.2 (West 2019).  The special circumstances are enumerated in 22 code 
sections, one of which, Section 17, contains 12 subsections each defining an independent basis for death 
eligibility.  Although Penal Code section 190.2 contains 33 special circumstances, the California Supreme 
Court invalidated section 190.2(a)(14) as unconstitutional.  People v. Superior Court (Engert), 31 Cal.3d 
797, 806 (1982). 
In 2018, California enacted Senate Bill 1437 that narrowed the application of the state’s first- and 
second-degree felony-murder doctrines to accomplices.  2018 Cal. Stats. c. 1015.  Under the modifications 
to California Penal Code section 189, a person who is not the actual perpetrator of the killing is not 
culpable by the felony-murder doctrine unless the state proves that the person aided and abetted the killing 
with the intent to kill or “was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless 
indifference to human life.”  Cal. Penal Code § 189(e) (West 2019).  The new standard “does not apply to a 
defendant when the victim is a peace officer who was killed while in the course of his or her duties, where 
the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was a peace officer engaged in the 
performance of his or her duties.”  Cal. Penal Code § 189(f) (West 2019).  With the exception of the police 
officer provision, the additional requirements to first-degree felony-murder incorporate the standard that 
has governed the felony-murder special circumstances contained in California Penal Code section since 
adoption of Proposition 115 in 1990.   
The legislation also narrowed second-degree murder by requiring that the state prove that the 
defendant acted with malice.  It provides that “[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his 
or her participation in a crime.”  Cal. Penal Code § 188(c) (West 2019).  Thus, a defendant’s intent to 
commit an underlying inherently dangerous non-homicide felony, or a finding that homicide was the 
natural and probable consequence of a non-homicide crime, is no longer sufficient for second-degree 
culpability.  See, e.g., People v. Chun, 5 Cal. 4th 1172 (2009) (describing history and application of second-
degree felony-murder rule).   
Unsurprisingly, this sweeping modification of the state’s expansive application of the felony-
murder doctrine for murder liability is being challenged in California courts.  In particular, prosecutors are 
arguing that the new law is invalid because it conflicts with Proposition 115, which the voter approved in 
1990, a position that has been adopted by one superior court.  Bob Egelko, California Law that Rolled Back 
Felony-Murder Rule Violates State Constitution, Judge Says, S.F. CHRONICLE, Feb. 12, 2019, available at 
https://www.sfchronicle.com/crime/article/California-law-that-rolled-back-felony-murder-13612142.php.   
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The addition of several special circumstances in the mid-1990s and 2000 are of 
particular concern in this study.  In 1995, the California Legislature added special 
circumstances to Penal Code section 190.2, including murders occurring during the 
commission of a carjacking44 and drive-by shootings.45  The author of Senate Bill 9 
justified the expansion of the death penalty as necessary to combat gang violence 
arguing, “In today’s society, gang-related shootings have become commonplace.  
Frequently, the victim is an unintended target, such as a child, a productive high school 
student with no gang affiliation, or a young mother who happens to live in the 
neighborhood targeted by drive-by shooters.”46   
Opponents to these provisions warned the California Legislature that “the broader 
the cases that are eligible for the death as a punishment, the greater the risk that the death 
penalty will be applied in an arbitrary and unconstitutional manner.”47  The California 
Attorney General’s Office expressed concern that the various expansions of the death 
penalty had resulted in few crimes not covered by the California scheme.48   
                                                          
44  1995 Cal. Stat. c. 477 § 1 (S.B. 32).  California voters approved Senate Bill 32 with the passage of 
Proposition 195, effective March 27, 1995; 1995 Cal. Stat. c. 478 (S.B. 9) ), approved by voters with the 
passage of Proposition 196, effective March 27, 1995.  As a result, the felony murder carjacking special 
circumstance and the juror killing special circumstance were added to the Penal Code as sections 
190.2(a)(17)(L) and 190.2(a)(20), and the felony murder kidnapping special circumstance was expanded to 
include murders resulting from carjacking kidnapping (Penal Code section 190.2(a)(17)(B)).  
45  1995 Cal. Stat. c. 478 (S.B. 9) ).  
46  Assembly Bill Analysis, Senate Bill 9 (June 26, 1995), available at http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/95-
96/bill/sen/sb_0001-0050/sb_9_cfa_950626_093857_asm_comm.html.  Senate Bill 9 became effective 
with the passage of Proposition 196, effective March 27, 1995.  The drive-by murder special circumstance 
was added as Penal Code section 190.2(21).   
47  Senate Committee Bill Analysis, Senate Bill 32 (Feb. 21, 1995) (citing opposition submitted by 
the American Civil Liberties Union), available at http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/95-96/bill/sen/sb_0001-
0050/sb_32_cfa_950221_155939_sen_comm.html. 
48  Mike Lewis, Death Penalty Quietly Moves Into Broader Territory, S.F. DAILY JOURNAL, Mar. 20, 
1996, at 1, 1, 7 (quoting Attorney General’s Death Penalty Coordinator as  “it is conceivable, although 
unlikely, that those who seek to further modify the law eventually could run out of legal territory to carve 
out.”); Mike Lewis, Expansion of Capital Crimes Nears Passage, HERALD RECORDER, Sept. 19, 1995, at 1, 
15 (“‘In the abstract, you could toss a bunch more crap in there, but you have to know your constitutional 
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Five years later, on March 7, 2000, the voters expanded the statute again by 
approving Proposition 21, which, inter alia, added the gang-related murder special 
circumstance as Penal Code section 190.2(a)(22).49  A ballot pamphlet argument urging 
its passage stated, “Prop 21 ends the ‘slap on the wrist’ of current law by imposing real 
consequences for GANG MEMBERS, RAPISTS AND MURDERERS who cannot be 
reached through prevention or education.”50  In effect, the statute delegated discretion for 
death penalty eligibility to the police definitions of gang-related crime and rosters of 
persons thought to be gang members.51  As a result of the expansions of Penal Code 
section 190.2, preeminent California legal scholar Gerald Uelmen testified that the state 
of California death penalty law, “imposes no meaningful limitations on the broad 
discretion of prosecutors and juries to seek and impose the death penalty for first degree 
murders in California.”52  He observed, “There is nothing “special” about the special 
circumstances in California’s death penalty law; they have been deliberately designed to 
encompass nearly all first degree murders.”53  
Defendants facing the death penalty have challenged the constitutionality of the 
                                                          
limits,’ said George Williamson, chief of the criminal division in the attorney general’ office.  ‘You have to 
be very careful.’”).   
49  Cal. Penal Code §190.2(a)(22) (West 2019). 
50  Voter Information Guide for 2000, Primary, at 48, available at 
https://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2187&context=ca_ballot_props (capitals in 
original). 
51  See, e.g., Alice Speri, New York City Gang Database Expanded by Over 70 Percent Under Mayor 
Bill De Blasio, THE INTERCEPT, June 11, 2018, available at https://interc.pt/2y2fIVB; People v. James 
Cramer, Court of Appeal, Sixth District, California, Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 211208 (reversing a 
conviction for drug sales because of the trial court’s admission of unduly prejudicial gang evidence 
proffered by police officers based on gang roster data). 
52  Declaration of Gerald F. Uelmen, supra note 38, at 27. 
53  Id. 
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California death penalty law regularly throughout its evolution.54  The California 
Supreme Court consistently has held that the California statute satisfied the 
constitutionally required narrowing function by the use of the special circumstances set 
forth in California Penal Code section 190.2(a).55  As the California Supreme Court held 
in People v. Bacigalupo, under the California death penalty law, “the section 190.2 
‘special circumstances’ perform the same constitutionally required ‘narrowing’ function 
as the ‘aggravating circumstances’ or ‘aggravating factors’ that some of the other states 
use in their capital sentencing statutes.”56   
IV. OVERBREADTH, RACE, AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT  
This section provides a brief context in the literature for the findings presented below.  
We first review the literature on measuring the success of capital punishment statutes to 
fulfill the narrowing mandate arising from Furman.  We then turn to the history of race 
and capital punishment and review of some of the many ways that race has been a 
significant concern throughout the history of capital punishment in the United States. 
A. Furman’s Failure: Overbreadth in Charging of Capital Murder 
Furman, Gregg, and the subsequent cases should have produced, across the states 
                                                          
54  Westlaw reports that, as of March 8, 2019, almost 2,000 opinions relating to Cal. Penal Code 
§190.2 have been published by the California Supreme Court alone and more than 800 have been brought 
in federal courts. 
55  Cal. Penal Code §190.2 (West 2019).   
56  6 Cal. 4th 457, 468 (1993); see also id. at 477 (emphasizing that the section 190.3 aggravating 
factors used in the selection phase of the California death penalty scheme “do not perform a ‘narrowing’ 
function”); see also People v. Visciotti, 2 Cal. 4th 1, 74-75 (1992) (rejecting the application of the 
requirement of Furman and Maynard that the section 190.3 aggravating factors in the selection phase of the 
California death penalty scheme must limit “open-ended discretion” because they do not perform a 
narrowing function; rather, under California’s death penalty statute, special circumstances in section 190.2 
function “to channel jury discretion by narrowing the class of defendants who are eligible for the death 
penalty”); People v. Cornwell, 37 Cal. 4th 50, 102 (2005) (“The state death penalty scheme meets Eighth 
Amendment requirements through its listing of special circumstances; the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances referred to in section 190.3 do not and need not perform a narrowing function.”). 
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authorizing capital punishment, a narrow set of cases that could clearly identify those 
whose crimes are readily distinguished from other “ordinary murders.”  The evidence to 
date, however, suggests that these requirements have not been met.  Relatively few 
studies estimate the rate of death eligibility using research at the case level because of the 
vast scope of such an undertaking, as demonstrated by this study.  The studies that have 
been done, however, raised serious questions about the ability of the post-Furman 
statutory schemes to narrow meaningfully the class of cases identified by state statutes as 
death eligible.57  As second set of studies provide an estimate of death sentencing among 
death eligible homicides, again suggesting that the substantial narrowing requirements of 
Furman and Gregg have not been applied successfully.58   
                                                          
57  See, e.g., Steven F. Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The California Death Penalty Scheme: Requiem for 
Furman?, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1283, 1326 (1997) (finding that 84% of first-degree California murder cases 
were death-eligible under the statute, and that 9.6% of those cases resulted in a death sentence); David C. 
Baldus, George Woodworth & Charles A. Pulaski, Jr., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL 
AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 268, n.31 (1990) (finding that 86% of murder cases in Georgia in the first five 
years of the post-Furman regime (1988-1992) were death eligible); Justin Marceau & Sam Kamin, Death 
Eligibility in Colorado: Many Are Called, Few Are Chosen, 84 Colo. L. Rev. 1069, 1098 (2012) (finding 
that Colorado’s capital sentencing system defined 92% of factually or actually first degree murder cases as 
death eligible); Raymond Paternoster et al., Justice by Geography and Race: The Administrative of the 
Death Penalty in Maryland, 1978-1999, 4 U. MD. L.J. ON RACE, RELIGION, GENDER, & CLASS 1, 18-19 & 
52, fig. 1 (2004) (finding that approximately 21% of first and second degree murder cases between August 
1978 and September 1999 were death eligible (1311 of approximately 6,000)); David C. Baldus, George 
Woodworth, Catherine M. Grosso, & Aaron M. Christet, Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the 
Administration of the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Nebraska Experience (1973-
1999), 81 NEB. L. REV. 486, 541 & n.181 (2002) (finding that 25% of homicides (175/ 689) were death 
eligible under the Nebraska death sentencing system between 1973 and 1999); Scott Phillips, Continued 
Racial Disparities in the Capital of Capital Punishment: The Rosenthal Era, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 131 (2008) 
(estimating a 3-5% death sentencing rate based on carefully curated Supplemental Homicide Reports on 
Texas homicides as estimates).  But see George Brauchlerd & Rich Ormand, Lies, Damn Lies, and Anti-
Death Penalty Research, 93 DENV. L. REV. 635 (2016) (presenting the article as “in part, a rebuttal to” 
Marceau and Kamin). 
58  See, e.g., Barbara O’Brien, Catherine M. Grosso, George Woodworth, & Abijah Taylor, 
Untangling the Role of Race in Capital Charging and Sentencing in North Carolina, 1990-2009, 94 N.C. L. 
REV. 1997, 2023 &  2024, tbl.2 (2016) (estimating that death-eligible murder cases in North Carolina 
during the 1990-2009 study period resulted in a death sentence in an estimated 6% of the cases); John J. 
Donohue, III, An Empirical Evaluation of the Connecticut Death Penalty System since 1973: Are There 
Unlawful Racial, Gender, and Geographic Disparities, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 637, 645-47  tbl.1 
(2014) (reporting that the Connecticut capital sentencing scheme between 1993 and 2007 starts from the 
universe of death eligible homicides and estimates that 5.8% of death eligible homicides resulted in a death 
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Most importantly for this Article, our earlier findings report that California’s 
death penalty statute fails to comply with the Eighth Amendment’s narrowing test.  First, 
we found that the death-eligibility rate among California homicide cases is the highest in 
the nation during the study period.  We found that 95% of all first-degree murder 
convictions and 59% of all second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter 
convictions were death eligible under California’s 2008 statute.  Second, we documented 
that a death sentence is imposed in only a small fraction of the death-eligible cases.  As a 
result, the California death sentencing rate of 4.4% among all death-eligible cases is 
among the lowest in the nation and over two-thirds lower than the death-sentencing rate 
in pre-Furman Georgia.59   
Although, as presented below, a number of studies of charging and sentencing 
outcomes have sought to identify potential racial disparities arising from the application 
of statutes, no previous study has closely examined racial disparities in the application of 
individual factors in a state death eligibility statute.  We address this question in this 
Article by examining racial disparities in the application of specific statutory special 
circumstances in California’s death statute.  As explained below, the extent to which a 
promiscuously broad statute creates room for arbitrary and capricious charging 
decisions–which themselves are racially biased–is the focus of our analysis.    
                                                          
sentence (12/205)); Katherine Beckett & Heather Evans, Race, Death, and Justice: Capital Sentencing in 
Washington State, 1981-2014, 7 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 77, 90 (2014) (estimating a death sentencing rate 
among death eligible homicides of 11.7% (35/298)); David C. Baldus, Catherine M. Grosso, George 
Woodworth, Richard Newell, Racial Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The 
Experience of the United States Armed Forces (1984-2005), 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1227, 1229 
(2011) (reporting a 15% death sentencing rate for cases between July 16, 1984, and October 13, 2005). 
59  See generally Furman at 45, supra note 7. 
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B. Race and Capital Punishment  
 As a starting point, it is useful to review the death penalty’s long association with 
racism in the United States.  This history informs both our analysis of the statutes and the 
implications of our findings.  Racial disparities have been endemic to the administration 
of capital punishment since the nation’s founding.60  Although much of the literature 
focuses on discrimination against Black defendants and victims, a growing body of 
literature has begun to document and analyze the deep and pervasive history of 
discrimination against Latinx defendants and victims.61   
 Before the Civil War, many Southern states explicitly legislated that slaves–and 
sometimes free Blacks–could be sentenced to death for crimes punishable by lesser 
penalties when committed by whites.62  Although the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution prohibits the imposition of differential penalties by race for the same crime–
and explicitly prohibits “the hanging of a black man for a crime for which the white man 
is not to be hanged”63–the death penalty has continued to be applied predominantly to 
                                                          
60  See CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 78 (2016); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 89 (2003); Stuart Banner, Traces of Slavery: Race and the Death Penalty in Historical 
Perspective, in FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE (A. Sarat and C. Ogletree, eds.) 97 (2006); 
JAMES MARQUART, SHELDEN ECKLAND-OLSEN, & JONATHAN SORENSON, THE ROPE, THE CHAIR AND THE 
NEEDLE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN TEXAS 1923-1990 (1994); Stephen Bright, Discrimination, Death and 
Denial: Race and the Death Penalty, in THE MACHINERY OF DEATH: THE REALITY OF AMERICA’S DEATH 
PENALTY REGIME 47 (David Dow & Mark Dow, eds., 2002). 
61  See Richard Delgado, The Law of the Noose: A History of Latino Lynching, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 297, 304-7 (2009) (exploring why the history of Latino lynching is not better known); Martin G. 
Urbina, A Qualitative Analysis of Latinos Executed in the United States Between 1975 and 1995: Who 
Were They?, 31 SOCIAL JUSTICE 242, 242 (2004) (noting that prior research has followed a Black/white 
dichotomous approach); see generally Camilo M. Ortiz, Latinos Nowhere in Sight:  Erased by Racism, 
Nativism, and the Black-White Binary, and Authoritarianism, 12 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 29 (2011) 
(collecting evidence of discrimination against Latinos); JOHN MACK FARAGHER, ETERNITY STREET: 
VIOLENCE AND JUSTICE IN FRONTIER LOS ANGELES 263-280 (2016 (documenting the use of lynching to 
punish and terrorize Latinx people in Los Angeles and Northern California). 
62  See, e.g., William Bowers, Glenn L. Pierce, & John F. McDevitt, LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATH AS 
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1864-1982 139-40 (1984); Stuart Banner, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 140-42 (2002); DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION 172 (2010); Franklin E. Zimring, THE 
CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2004).  
63  See Eric Foner, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877, at 244-47, 
256–59 (1988) (observing that Civil Rights Act supporters in the 39th Congress, “rejected the entire idea of 
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Black defendants and those convicted of crimes against white victims throughout the 
country’s history.64   
A robust literature confirms that racial disparities have infected capital 
punishment in the modern era.65  Between 1930, when official statistics on capital 
punishment were first issued, and the moratorium in executions in 1972 following 
Furman v. Georgia, almost half the persons executed for murder and 90% of those 
executed for rape were African American, despite their much lower share of the 
defendant population for each of those crimes and their share of the United States 
population.66  Those same racial disparities in capital punishment animated the majority 
concurrences of three of the Justices in Furman.   
Race as a contested jurisprudential factor in death sentencing and execution 
reached a watershed in McCleskey v. Kemp.67  Although the Court concluded in 
McCleskey that the proof of arbitrariness arising from race was inadequate, forty years of 
                                                          
laws differentiating between Black and white in access to the courts and penalties for crimes. The shadow 
of the Black Codes hung over these debates, and [Congressman Lyman] Trumbull began his discussion of 
the Civil Rights Bill with a reference to recent laws of Mississippi and South Carolina, declaring his 
intention ‘to destroy all these discriminations’”). 
64  See Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death, and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial 
Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penalty, in FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE: RACE 
AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 211, 212 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds. 2006). 
65  See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and Capital Punishment, in BEYOND REPAIR?: AMERICA’S DEATH 
PENALTY 121 (Stephen P. Garvey, ed. 2003); see generally Symposium, Race to Execution, 53 DePaul L. 
Rev. 1401 (2004); Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial 
Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 433 (1995); Bryan A. 
Stevenson & Ruth E. Friedman, Deliberate Indifference: Judicial Tolerance of Racial Bias in Criminal 
Justice, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 509 (1994); Barbara O’Brien, Catherine M. Grosso, George Woodworth 
& Abijah Taylor, Untangling the Role of Race in Capital Charging and Sentencing in North Carolina, 
1990-2009, 94 N.C.L. REV. 1997 (2014); Benjamin Fluery-Steiner, Paul Kaplan, & Jamie Longazel, Racist 
Localisms and the Enduring Cultural Life of America’s Death Penalty: Lessons from Maricopa County, 
Arizona, 66 STUD. IN L., POL., & SOC’Y, 63 (2015). 
66  Anthony G. Amsterdam, Opening Remarks: Race and the Death Penalty Before and After 
McCleskey, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 34, 35 (2007) (“A cardinal feature of the death penalty in the 
United States has always been its racially biased use.”). 
67  481 U.S. at 306. 
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continued study since then have demonstrated that the system is indeed arbitrary.  Despite 
the strong evidence of interracial and intraracial sentencing disparities,68 evidence that 
was not contested by the Court, the McCleskey Majority demanded a showing of 
discriminatory purpose to satisfy the evidentiary demands for a discrimination claim.69 
Both before and after the McCleskey decision, research on racial disparities in 
capital punishment focused attention on charging decisions by prosecutors and sentencing 
decisions by judges and juries, and found robust and consistent evidence of disparate 
racial treatment of Black or Latinx defendants or victims.70  Studies with varying levels 
of detail and methodological sophistication have been conducted in numerous states.71  
                                                          
68  See generally David C. Baldus et al., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 1990 (presenting 
the studies underlying McCleskey’s claim, in full).  
69  In a conversation with Professor John Jeffries, Justice Powell’s biographer, shortly after he left the 
Court, Justice Powell expressed his regrets at having written the majority opinion in McCleskey.  Justice 
Powell said that given a second chance, he would now join the four dissenters in that case and reverse the 
majority of death sentences in the United States.  Powell went further, saying to Professor Jeffries that 
“capital punishment should be abolished.”  John C. Jeffries, A Change of Mind that Came Too Late, New 
York Times, June 23, 1994, at A23. 
70  See Catherine M. Grosso, Barbara O’Brien, Abijah Taylor & George Woodworth, Race 
Discrimination and the Death Penalty, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: 
REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 540 (James R. 
Acker, Robert M. Bohm & Charles S. Lanier eds., 3d ed. 2014) (reviewing the literature).  
71  In alphabetical order by state: Peg Bortner & Andy Hall, Arizona First-Degree Murder Cases 
Summary of 1995-1999 Indictments: Data Set II, Research Report to Arizona Capital Case Commission 
(2002); Stephen P. Klein & John E. Rolph, Relationship of Offender and Victim Race to Death Penalty 
Sentences in California, 32 JURIMETRICS J. 33 (1991); Glenn Pierce & Michael Radelet, The Impact of 
Legally Inappropriate Factors on Death Sentencing for California Homicides, 1990–1999, 46 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 1 (2005–2006); Steven F. Shatz & Terry Dalton, Challenging the Death Penalty with 
Statistics: Furman, McCleskey, and a Single County Case Study, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1227 (2012) 
(California); Scott Anderson, As Flies to Wanton Boys: Death-Eligible Defendants in Georgia and 
Colorado, 40 TRIAL TALK 9-16 (1991); Stephanie Hindson et al., Race, Gender, Religion and Death 
Sentencing in Colorado, 1980–1999, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 549 (2006); Meg Beardsley, et al. Disquieting 
Discretion: Race, Geography & The Colorado Death Penalty in the First Decade of the Twenty-First 
Century, 92 DEN. U. L. REV. 431 (2015) (Colorado); John J. Donohue III, An Empirical Evaluation of the 
Connecticut Death Penalty System Since 1973: Are There Unlawful Racial, Gender, and Geographic 
Disparities?, 11 J. EMPIRIC. L. STUD. 637 (2014); Sheri Lynn Johnson, John H. Blume, Theodore 
Eisenberg, Valerie P. Hans & Martin T Wells, The Delaware Death Penalty: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA 
L. REV. 1925 (2011) (Delaware); David C. Baldus et al., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A 
LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990) (Georgia); Sherod Thaxton, Disentangling Disparity: Exploring 
Racially Disparate Effect and Treatment in Capital Charging, 45 AM. J. CRIM. L. 95 (2018) (Georgia); 
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Although not universal, the overwhelming majority of these studies indicate that the 
likelihood of receiving the death penalty are enhanced if the victim is white as opposed to 
Black, Latinx, or another race.72  Subsequent charging and sentencing studies find lower 
                                                          
Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, Race, Region and Death Sentencing in Illinois, 1988-1997, Report 
of the Governor’s Commission on Capital Punishment, tech. app. I, Report A (April 14, 2002); Thomas J. 
Keil & Gennardo F. Vito, Race and the Death Penalty in Kentucky Murder Trials: 1976-1991, 20 AM. J. 
CRIM. JUST. 17 (1995); Raymond Paternoster & Robert Brame, Reassessing Race Disparities in Maryland 
Capital Cases, 46 CRIMINOLOGY 971 (2008); Glenn Pierce & Michael Radelet, Death Sentencing in East 
Baton Rouge Parish, 1990–2008, 71 LA. L. REV. 647 (2010–2011) (Louisiana); David Keys & Teresa 
Guess, The Prevailing Injustices in the Application of the Death Penalty in Missouri (1978–1996), 32 SOC. 
JUST. 151 (2005); Katherine Barnes et al., Place Matters (Most): An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial 
Decision-Making in Death-Eligible Cases, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 305 (2009) (Missouri); Michael Lenza et al., 
The Prevailing Injustices in the Application of the Death Penalty in Missouri (1978-1996), 32 Soc. Just. 
151 (2005); David C. Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of the Death 
Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Nebraska Experience (1973–1999), 81 Neb. L. Rev. 486 
(2002); State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059 (N.J. 1992); David S. Baime, Report to the Supreme Court 
Systemic Proportionality Review Project 2000-2001 Term (June 1, 2001) (New Jersey); Leigh Bienen et 
al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 
RUTG. L. REV. 27 (1988); Barbara O’Brien, et al., Untangling the Role of Race in Capital Charging and 
Sentencing in North Carolina, 1990-2009, 94 N.C. L. Rev. 1997 (2016); David C. Baldus et al., Racial 
Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with 
Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638 (1998) (Pennsylvania); Raymond 
Paternoster & Ann Marie Kazyaka, The Administration of the Death Penalty in South Carolina: 
Experiences Over the First Few Years, 39 S.C. L. Rev. 245 (1988); Michael Songer & Isaac Unah, The 
Effect of Race, Gender, and Location on Prosecutorial Decisions to Seek the Death Penalty in South 
Carolina, 58 S.C. L. REV. 161 (2006); John M. Scheb II et al., Race, Prosecutors, and Juries: The Death 
Penalty in Tennessee, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 338 (2008); Deon Brock et al., Arbitrariness in the Imposition of 
Death Sentences in Texas: An Analysis of Four Counties by Offense Seriousness, Race of Victim, and Race 
of Offender, 28 AM. J. OF CRIM. L. 43 (2000); Scott Phillips, Continued Racial Disparities in the Capital of 
Capital Punishment: The Rosenthal Era, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 131 (2012); Scott Phillips, Racial Disparities in 
the Capital of Capital Punishment, 45 HOUS. L. Rev. 807 (2008); Sheldon Ekland-Olson, Structured 
Discretion, Racial Bias, and the Death Penalty: The First Decade after Furman in Texas, 69 SOC. SCI. Q. 4 
(1988) (Texas); and JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT AND REVIEW COMMISSION OF THE VIRGINIA GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY, REVIEW OF VIRGINIA’S SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2002) (Virginia). 
72  See also Steven F. Shatz & Terry Dalton, Challenging the Death Penalty with Statistics: Furman, 
McCleskey, and A Single County Case Study, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1227, 1246-51 (2013) (reviewing the 
literature on race and capital punishment); Catherine Lee, Hispanics and the Death Penalty: 
Discriminatory Charging Practices in San Joaquin County, California, 35 J. OF CRIM. JUST. 17, 22 (2007) 
(reviewing the literature and reporting that “The results replicated previous findings, discovering that 
defendants in White victim cases . . . faced much greater odds of being charged with a death-eligible 
offense than did defendants in Black victim cases. This investigation also permitted Hispanic/White 
comparisons. Defendants in White victim cases faced greater odds of being charged with capital homicide 
than defendants in Hispanic victim cases.”); Michelle A. Petrie & James E. Coverdill, Who Lives and Dies 
on Death Row? Race, Ethnicity, and Post-Sentence Outcomes in Texas, 57 SOC. PROBS. 630 (2010) 
(reporting that cases involving minorities—with Black or Latino offenders or victims—have lower hazards 
of execution than cases in which both offenders and victims are white). 
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odds but consistent and statistically significant disparities.73  
For example, a recent study of capital charging and sentencing decisions in North 
Carolina between 1990 and 2009 was modeled on the Baldus study of Georgia.74  The 
primary model analyzing death sentencing among all death-eligible cases showed that—
even after controlling for multiple measures of culpability—cases with at least one white 
victim face odds of receiving a death sentence that were 2.17 times the odds faced by all 
other cases.  The evidence further suggested that this effect arises primarily in charging 
decisions, where prosecutors systematically disregard cases in which Black defendants 
kill Black victims.  The odds of a Black defendant/Black victim case advancing to a 
capital trial are 2.6 times lower than the odds faced by all other cases. The study found 
that white victim cases and Black defendant/Black victim cases pulled strongly in 
opposite directions. In both instances, race—a factor unrelated to culpability and 
repugnant to the criminal justice system—plays a significant role.75 
Recent research has documented additional ways that race infects capital 
decision-making.  For example, scholars have tied increased exposure to capital 
punishment for Latinx defendants to “the pervasive, dehumanizing political rhetoric 
surrounding immigration reform.”76  Maritza Perez collects evidence of negative contacts 
between Latinos and the criminal justice system to build her case.  For example, she 
notes that documents that Latinos face “[a]pproximately 60 percent of hate crimes 
                                                          
73  See infra notes 75-84.  
74  See David C. Baldus et al., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 44-46, 313-32 (1990) 
(presenting the charging and sentencing study). 
75  Barbara O’Brien et al., Untangling the Role of Race in Capital Charging and Sentencing in North 
Carolina, 1990-2009, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1997 (2016). 
76  Maritza Perez, Los Lazos Viven: California’s Death Row and Systematic Latino Lynching, 37 
WHITTIER L. REV. 377, 378 (2016). 
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motivated by race or ethnicity,”77 “are more likely than their white peers to be arrested,”78 
“are more likely than white people to be denied bail, required to pay bail, or obligated to 
pay a higher bail to be released,”79 and “during plea bargaining, prosecutors are more 
likely to offer Latinos punitive deals—which often include a custodial sentence—
compared to their white counterparts.”80   
Professor Jennifer Eberhardt and colleagues used the data from the Baldus study 
of charging and sentencing in Philadelphia to show that among defendants convicted of 
murdering a white victim, defendants whose appearance was more stereotypically Black 
(e.g., darker skinned, with a broader nose and thicker lips) were sentenced more harshly 
and, in particular, were more likely to be sentenced to death than if their features were 
less stereotypically Black.  This finding held even after the researchers controlled for the 
many non-racial factors that might account for the results.81  Analogous stereotypes about 
Latinx defendants, including stereotypes about dangerousness, create a risk of similar 
outcomes.82  
                                                          
77  Id. at 389. 
78  Id. at 394. 
79  Id.  
80  Id.; see also Martin G. Urbina, A Qualitative Analysis of Latinos Executed in the United States 
Between 1975 and 1995: Who Were They?, 31 SOCIAL JUSTICE 242, 244-46 (2005) (reviewing data on 
exposure to the criminal justice process and Latinos).  
81  Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants 
Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOLOG. SCI. 383 (2006) (reporting results of an experiment 
on race using data from David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-
Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, With Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1638 (1998)). 
82  See Benjamin Fleury-Steiner & Victor Argothy, Lethal ‘Borders’: Elucidating Jurors’ Racialized 
Discipline to Punish in Latino Defendant Death Cases, 6 Punishment & Society 67, 70 (2004) (“The image 
of Latino/a Americans as ‘dangerous’ and ‘immoral’ goes back at least as early as Columbus’s voyage to 
the Greater Antilles in the late 15th Century. Chronicling a series of observations of the New World, 
Columbus’s grossly inaccurate descriptions of early indigenous peoples as ‘fierce’, ‘immoral’, and 
‘cannibalistic’, served as important ‘seeds for the development of racialized stereotypes.’”) (citing Diego 
O. Castro, “Hot Blood and Easy Virtue”: Mass Media and the Making of Latino/A Stereotypes, in IMAGES 
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Studies of jury decisions similarly find evidence of racial bias.  Benjamin Fleury-
Steiner and Victor Argothy analyzed Capital Jury Project juror interviews from capital 
cases involving Latinx defendants in Texas and California.  The scholars examined 
responses that jurors in Latino defendant death cases referred to the defendant’s or the 
family of the defendant’s appearance and courtroom behavior.  The intention was to 
evaluate how each juror drew on cultural understandings of Latino identity in describing 
their punishment decisions.83  For example, the scholars identified an exchange in which 
jurors described defendant family members in the courtroom in a manner that invoked 
stereotypes of “threatening Latinos,” thereby silently “locating the defendant among the 
‘hard looking Hispanic’ group.”84  The scholars observed that “[j]udging a defendant they 
know nothing or very little about, former white and Latino capital jurors import … a 
racialized discourse from the outside in.”85   
Researchers consistently have found racial disparities in jury selection throughout 
the country.86  The most recent study examined race-based juror selection in trials held 
                                                          
OF COLOR, IMAGES OF CRIME 135 (Coramae Richey Mann & Marjorie S. Zatz eds., 1998)); JOHN MACK 
FARAGHER, ETERNITY STREET: VIOLENCE AND JUSTICE IN FRONTIER LOS ANGELES 263-280 (2016 
(documenting the use of lynching to punish and terrorize Latinx people in Los Angeles and Northern 
California). 
83  Benjamin Fleury-Steiner & Victor Argothy, Lethal ‘Borders’: Elucidating Jurors’ Racialized 
Discipline to Punish in Latino Defendant Death Cases, 6 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 67, 74 (2004) (describing 
the analytical focus of the research). 
84  Id. at 78. 
85  Id. at 80.  In related research, Cynthia Willis-Esqueda and Russ K.E. Espinoza found that 
European American mock jurors recommended the death penalty significantly more often for low 
socioeconomic status Latino defendant in a weak mitigation evidence condition.  Russ K.E. Espinoza & 
Cynthia Willis-Esqueda, The Influence of Mitigation Evidence, Ethnicity, and SES on Death Penalty 
Decisions by European American and Latino Venire Persons, 21 CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC 
MINORITY PSYCHOL. 288 (2015).  Additionally, Professor Justin Levinson found that death-qualified jurors 
harbored stronger racial biases than excluded jurors.  Justin D. Levinson et al., Devaluing Death: An 
Empirical Study of Implicit Racial Bias on Jury-Eligible Citizens in Six Death Penalty States, 89 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 513 (2014). 
86  See Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, A Stubborn Legacy: The Overwhelming Importance 
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from 1992 to 2017 in Mississippi’s Fifth Circuit Court District found racial disparities in 
peremptory strike decisions, even after controlling for race-neutral factors.87  A team of 
data experts and reporters analyzed juror responses in 13 capital trials for about 65 
different variables, including the race of the juror, whether the juror was accused of a 
crime, and whether the juror was hesitant about the death penalty.  These researchers 
built a logistic regression model to determine how individual variables affected the 
likelihood that a juror was removed by a prosecutor’s peremptory challenge.  The report 
determined that a Black juror in a capital murder trial was 8.65 times more likely to be 
struck than a similarly situated white juror.  “Being Black was the greatest predictor of 
being struck in capital trials,” the authors wrote, “even more than expressing hesitation 
about imposing the death penalty.”88  Experimental evidence shows much the same bias 
as shown in the actual juror studies.89 
Race may also infect capital decision-making prior to the selection of jurors, as 
early as the arrest of a suspect by police.  A forthcoming study examines homicides 
reported in the FBI’s Supplementary Homicide Reports between 1976 and 2009, finding 
that homicides with white victims were more likely to be cleared by the arrest of a 
suspect than homicides with non-white victims.  The study also finds that counties with 
large non-white populations have lower clearance rates than predominantly white 
                                                          
of Race in Jury Selection in 173 Post-Batson North Carolina Capital Trials, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1531 (2012 
(collecting studies). 
87  Will Craft, Peremptory Strikes in Mississippi’s Fifth Circuit Court District, APM Reports (2018), 
available at https://www.apmreports.org/files/peremptory_strike_methodology.pdf. 
88  Id. 
89  Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Race-Based Judgments, Race-Neutral Justifications: 
Experimental Examination of Peremptory Use and the Batson Challenge Procedure, 31 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 261 (2007) (reviewing the literature and presenting new research). 
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counties.90  Racial disparities in police responses to potentially capital-eligible murders 
raise serious doubts as to whether the death penalty can be equitably applied.  If implicit 
bias in police agencies produces a biased pool of capital-eligible defendants, the race-
infected charging and prosecution of capital-eligible defendants is likely to multiply those 
biases.91 
In the past decade, research on racial disparities has been dispositive of 
constitutionally impermissible practices in charging and sentencing under state 
constitutional law.  The Connecticut Supreme Court found the death penalty statute in 
that state to be infected by invidious racial discrimination, and ruled it unconstitutional in 
2015.92  Likewise, the Washington Supreme Court invalidated the state death penalty 
statute because empirical research demonstrated that is imposed in an arbitrary and 
racially biased manner in violation of state constitutional law.93 
                                                          
90  Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Police, Race, and the Production of Capital Homicides, 24 
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2019). 
91  Ronald J. Tabak, Is Racism Irrelevant?  Or Should the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act be 
Enacted to Substantially Diminish Racial Discrimination in Capital Sentencing?, 18 NYU REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 777 (1990). 
92  State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 1, 113 (2015) (“Four members of this court likewise have concluded 
that the degree of factfinder discretion required by the federal constitution means that the death penalty in 
Connecticut has been and inevitably will continue to be imposed with a degree of discrimination that is 
impermissible under the state constitution….invidious discrimination . . . pave[s] a smoother path to 
execution for a subset of the population.”).  In a subsequent 2015 opinion, that Court ruled that the ban on 
capital punishment would be retroactive.  State v. Santiago, 319 Conn. 935 (Oct. 30, 2015). 
 The Connecticut court relied on evidence provided by Professor Donohue who studied the 205 
death-eligible murders that led to homicide convictions in Connecticut from 1973-2007. He found 
statistically significant evidence that minority defendants who kill white people are more likely to receive a 
death sentence than white defendants in comparable cases. Donohue’s findings speak to overbreadth as 
well as race discrimination.  He found that only one of the nine death sentences sustained during the study 
period actually fell among the most egregious death-eligible cases. He found that there were between 35 
and 46 equally egregious death-eligible cases where the defendant did not receive a death sentence among 
the cases where defendants were sentenced to death.  John J. Donohue III, An Empirical Evaluation of the 
Connecticut Death Penalty System Since 1973: Are There Unlawful Racial, Gender, and Geographic 
Disparities? 11 J. EMPIRIC. L. STUD. 637 (2014). 
93  Washington v. Gregory, 192 Wash. 2d 1, 5, 427 P.3d 621, 627 (2018) (invalidating the state death 
penalty because empirical research demonstrated that is imposed in an arbitrary and racially biased 
manner”).  The Washington court relied on evidence provided by Katherine Beckett and Heather Evans 
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V.  DATA AND METHODS 
This Article reports the second set of findings from a research project designed to 
evaluate the extent to which the California death penalty law satisfies the constitutional 
narrowing requirements.94  The earlier research, published in Furman at 45, concludes 
that the enormous breadth of California’s statutory special circumstances combined with 
the state’s extremely low death sentencing rate among death eligible cases fails to comply 
with Furman’s narrowing requirement.95  This Article focuses on the application of 
individual special circumstances and evaluates the extent to which special circumstances 
target defendants by race or ethnicity.  Such racial and ethnic heterogeneity in death 
eligibility only rarely has been identified, but clearly was on the minds of the Furman 
majority.96  This analysis is essential to identify extent of the limitations—if not 
failures—of states to satisfy Furman’s narrowing requirement. 
A. The Universe and Sample of Cases 
To conduct our analysis of the narrowing effect of California’s post-Furman law, we 
examined the universe as all defendants convicted of first-degree murder, second-degree 
murder, and voluntary manslaughter, using a machine-readable database produced by the 
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR).97  This database 
                                                          
showing that jurors are 4.5 times more likely to impose a death sentence when the defendant is Black.  
Katherine Beckett & Heather Evans, Race, Death and Justice: Capital Sentencing in Washington State, 
1981-2014, 6 COLUMBIA J. RACE & L. 77, 101-104 (2016) 
94  Cal. Penal Code § 190.3 (West 2019).  
95  Furman at 45, supra note 7. 
96  See, e.g., Sherod Thaxton, Disentangling Discrimination, supra note 71. 
97  The state was directed by the federal district courts in the underlying habeas corpus proceedings to 
produce the database used to construct the stratified random sample and probation reports for the cases that 
we identified as part of the sample. 
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includes information on 27,453 cases with a date of offense between January 1, 1978, and 
June 30, 2002.98  The database includes 32% first-degree murder cases, 29% second-
degree murder cases, and 39% voluntary manslaughter.   
From this universe, we derived a 6.9% (1,900/27,453) sample.  We stratified the 
sample on three dimensions to produce a more representative sample of the cases than 
would have been produced by a random sampling method.  The first dimension, the crime 
of conviction, provides proportionate representation for the first-degree, second-degree, 
and voluntary manslaughter conviction cases.   
The second dimension is the population density of the county of prosecution.99  We 
designed this dimension with four levels to obtain a representative sample of smaller and 
more rural counties.  Our goal was 25% of the sample from Los Angeles (which accounts 
for 42% of the cases in the universe), and 25% of the sample from each of the three other 
groups of counties ranked in terms of population density.100   
Third, we stratified the sample on the basis of four time periods that would enable us 
to over-represent in the sample cases from the Carlos Window,101 during which time the 
                                                          
98  For each case, the CDCR database includes information on the date of offense, crime of 
conviction, county of prosecution, county court case number, CDCR case number, date of conviction, and 
the gender and age of the defendant.   
99 The data source was County Population Per Square Mile: 2000 - Department of Finance, 
California Statistical Abstract, Sec. A, Table A-1 (county land square miles), Sec. B, Table B-3 (county 
population) (2001). 
100  The counties in the four population density levels from low (1) to high (4) density are as follows.  
Level 1 has 41 counties with a population density per square mile of fewer than 200 people (Alpine, 
Amador, Butte, Calaveras, Colusa, Del Norte, El Dorado, Fresno, Glenn, Humboldt, Imperial, Inyo, Kern, 
Kings, Lake, Lassen, Madera, Mariposa, Mendocino, Merced, Modoc, Mono, Monterey, Napa, Nevada, 
Placer, Plumas, San Benito, San Bernardino, San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara, Shasta, Sierra, Siskiyou, 
Sutter, Tehama, Trinity, Tulare, Tuolumne, Yolo, and Yuba).  Level 2 has nine counties with a population 
per square mile larger than 200 and smaller than 700 (Marin, Riverside, San Diego, San Joaquin, Santa 
Cruz, Solano, Sonoma, Stanislaus, and Ventura).  Level 3 has seven counties with a population per square 
mile between 700 and 3400 people (Alameda, Contra Costa, Orange, Sacramento, San Francisco, San 
Mateo, and Santa Clara).  Level 4 is Los Angeles. 
101  See supra note 40. 
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two habeas corpus petitioners raising the narrowing challenge to the California statute 
were sentenced to death.102  Our goal was a sample with 57% of the cases from this time 
period.   
Our methods produced a stratified random sample of cases consisting of 48 strata:  3 
offense categories x 4 county population density categories x 4 time periods.  For each 
stratum, we weighted the cases in the sample on the basis of the ratio of the number of 
cases in the universe and the sample.  For example, if a stratum contained 100 cases in 
the universe and 20 cases in the sample, the weight for each case in the sample from that 
stratum would be 5.0 (100/20). 
Table 1 presents the final sample and estimated universe, by conviction and by 
sentence outcome.  Each line of information includes the number of cases in the 1,900 
case sample and in the 27,453 case estimated universe.  Line 1 reports that the sample 
includes 61 death sentenced cases, 193 resulting in life without parole (LWOP), and 
1,646 resulting in a sentence less than LWOP.  Lines 2-4 report the distribution of these 
sentencing outcomes by conviction.  Column F reports that 764 of the cases in the sample 
resulted in a first-degree murder conviction, 491 in a second-degree murder conviction, 
and 645 in a voluntary manslaughter conviction.   
  
                                                          
102  See supra note 7.  The four time periods are January 1, 1978 to December 11, 1983, December 12, 
1983 to October 13, 1987 (the Carlos Window), October 14, 1987 to December 31, 1992, and January 1, 
1993 to June 30, 2002. 
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Table 1.  Description of the Sample by Sentence Outcome 
 A B C D E F 
   Death LWOP Term of Years Total 
1. Total Sample 3% 61 10% 193 87% 1,646 1900 
  Weighted 3% 705 9% 2,364 89% 24,384 27,453 
2. First degree murder 
conviction 
Sample 8% 61 25% 193 67% 510 764 
 Weighted 8% 705 27% 2,364 65% 5,642 8,711 
3. Second degree murder 
conviction 
Sample - 0 - 0 100% 491 491 
 Weighted - 0 - 0 100% 7,900 7,900 
4. Voluntary manslaughter 
conviction 
Sample - 0 - 0 100% 645 645 
 Weighted - 0 - 0 100% 10,842 10,842 
 
B. Data Sources for Cases 
The primary source of information on each case was the probation report prepared by 
the county probation officer with jurisdiction over the case.  California law requires the 
preparation of a probation report in each homicide regardless of the crime of conviction 
and sentence.103  The purpose of the report is to justify the probation officer’s 
recommendation on the appropriateness of probation as a sentencing alternative in the 
case.  These reports, routinely relied upon by California courts, are subject to 
examination and correction by both the prosecuting authorities and defendants.104 
One limitation of the probation reports is that they are often prepared pre-trial so that 
the ultimate crime of conviction may not be noted in the report.  When that occurred, we 
consulted the crime of conviction reported in the CDCR database.  On other occasions, 
the probation report contained insufficient procedural information because it failed to 
report the crime charged and/or the basis of the conviction (by guilt trial verdict or guilty 
plea), information that may be essential to assess the death eligibility of a case.   
A number of probation reports also included insufficient substantive information 
                                                          
103  Cal. Penal Code § 1203 (West 2019). 
104  Cal. Penal Code § 1203.01 (West 2019). 
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about the facts of the crime.  Missing procedural or substantive information occurred in 
16% of the cases for which we received a probation report from the state.  The Habeas 
Corpus Resource Counsel (HCRC) cured the insufficiency in 106 cases, thus reducing the 
percentage of cases with missing information to 11%.105 
As noted above, the state’s obligation to provide probation reports was defined by 
court orders.  Some, however, were not produced by the state or contained no usable 
information.  When we encountered these situations, we replaced the probation report 
with a substitute report that was selected in random order from the sampling lists.  
C. The Coding Process for Individual Cases 
Each case was coded into the data collection instrument (DCI) based primarily on the 
probation reports.  The information in the probation reports provided the basis for the 
final coding decisions unless an information insufficiency was present and we obtained 
additional information from the HCRC.  We also consulted appellate judicial opinions 
when applicable.  The coding of the data collection instrument for the cases in the sample 
was conducted by thirteen University of Iowa law students and eight recent University of 
Iowa law graduates.106   
The DCI documents charging and sentencing decisions and, if the case was capitally 
charged, any special circumstances alleged, found, or rejected.  It also documents 
                                                          
105  The HCRC represented one of the underlying petitioners in the federal habeas corpus proceedings. 
HCRC consulted trial and appellate court records in the case and report the missing information if it was 
available.  When the HCRC was able to provide us with documents containing the information needed 
about a case, it was coded accordingly and the case was returned to the active sample of cases.   
106 The Iowa law students were Sadad Ali, Peter D’Angelo, John Magana, Jacob Natwick, Fangzhou 
Ping, Thomas Farrens, Folke Simons, Erin Snider, Jason Stoddard, James Vaglio, Porntiwa Wijitgomen, 
Fei Yu, and Weiyan Zhang.  The recent law graduates were Rebecca Bowman, Edward Broders, Theresa 
Dvorak, David Franker, Luke Hannan, Beth Moffett, Amanda Stahle, and Kristen Stoll. 
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sentencing outcomes reported in the probation report.  The DCI also assesses liability for 
first-degree murder and the factual presence of each special circumstance under pre-
Furman Georgia law, and post-Furman Carlos Window California law, and 2008 
California law.  A final section of the DCI summarizes the coder’s judgments of the death 
eligibility of the case under each of the three legal regimes.  We evaluate the application 
of special circumstances under the third regime, 2008 California law. 
1. Identifying liability for first-degree murder and the factual presence 
of special circumstances in the cases   
The HCRC provided a detailed summary of the law concerning the elements of 
murder liability to the Iowa coding team.107  When legal questions arose under the terms 
of the coding protocol, the coders certified legal questions to HCRC counsel to which 
HCRC replied in writing.   
We applied two core principles of interpretation to assess the factual death eligibility 
of each case.  The first principle is the “controlling fact finding” rule, which limits the 
coders’ discretion to override authoritative fact findings of juries and judges in particular 
cases.108  The rule stipulates that if an authoritative fact finder (judge or jury) with 
responsibility for finding a defendant liable for first-degree murder convicts the 
defendant of second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter, that finding is considered 
to be a controlling fact and the coder must code the case at the reduced level of homicidal 
                                                          
107  These summaries were provided to the California Attorney General’s Office, which represents 
California in the federal habeas corpus proceedings, and were also entered into evidence at the evidentiary 
hearing conducted by the district court in Ashmus v. Wong. 
108 David Baldus, George Woodworth, David Zuckerman, Neil Alan Weiner & Catherine M. Grosso, 
Empirical Studies of Race and Geographic Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A 
Primer on the Key Methodological Issues in THE FUTURE OF AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY AN AGENDA FOR 
THE NEXT GENERATION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT RESEARCH 153, 164-65 (C. Lanier, W. Bowers, and J. 
Acker eds., 2009) (explaining the rationale of the CFF rule). 
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liability in the absence of overwhelming evidence of jury nullification.  The rule also 
holds that an authoritative fact finding of first-degree murder or a first-degree murder 
guilty plea is a controlling fact, and the case will be coded at that level of liability.  The 
same rule applies with respect to allegations and findings of the presence or absence of 
special circumstances in the case and defendant admissions of their presence.109  
The second core principle of interpretation, known as the legal sufficiency standard, 
assesses whether a California appellate court would affirm a jury conviction for first-
degree murder or a jury’s finding of the presence of a special circumstance in the case if a 
jury had made either of those findings and the finding was challenged on appeal for a 
lack of sufficient evidence.  In the application of this principle, exculpatory evidence 
offered by the defendant is given no weight, but incriminating evidence offered by the 
defendant is credited.  
Coders relied on three forms of authority to support their judgments whether the facts 
satisfied the legal sufficiency test.  The strongest level of authority was a factually 
comparable case in which a jury or trial court’s first-degree murder or special 
circumstance finding of fact was sustained or reversed by a California appellate court 
when challenged with a claim of evidentiary insufficiency.  The second level of authority 
was a factually comparable case in this study in which a fact finder returned a finding of 
fact on first-degree murder liability or the presence of a special circumstance that was not 
disturbed on appeal.  The third level of authority was the case law and legal 
memorandum provided by HCRC.    
We measured the presence of individual special circumstances under each of the three 
                                                          
109  Prosecutors are not viewed as controlling fact finders in the same way as jurors and judges.   
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legal regimes.  (The analysis in this Article relies on the assessments under 2008 
California law.)  Coding assessments allowed coders to identify situations in which the 
presence of a special circumstance was close call.  Close call classifications arose when 
the special circumstance classification was not determined by a controlling finding of fact 
and the circumstances of the offense were not sufficiently well understood to support 
clear coding.  When we were uncertain how an appellate court would rule on finding a 
special circumstance in the case, we coded it a close call. 
These distinctions produced two measures of death eligibility – a conservative 
measure that limited death eligibility to “clearly present” classifications and a liberal 
measure that classified a case as death eligible if that status was clearly present or a close 
call.  In Furman at 45, we note these distinctions and report both the conservative and 
liberal estimates.  They did not make a substantive difference in that analysis.  For this 
reason, for the purposes of this article, we rely only upon the liberal measure.  That is the 
analysis present below considers a special circumstance present when the coders coded 
“clearly present” or found a “close call.” 
2.  Coding Defendant and Victim Race and Ethnicity 
Limited and missing information for race or ethnicity presented a significant issue 
in this study.  The original sources used to code this database did not regularly report race 
or ethnicity of the defendants or name, race, or ethnicity of the victims.  The coders were 
instructed to code race and ethnicity when it was available in the probation reports.  
HCRC consulted trial and appellate court records in the case and identified victim names, 
and defendant and victim race and ethnicity, where available.  As starting point, the 
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initial coding here reflects all of the limitations in the race or ethnicity designations of the 
court and prison officials.110   
The initial coding process identified 81% of defendant race or ethnicity 
(1,546/1,900), but only 33% of victim race or ethnicity (630/1,900).  As noted, the 
probation reports often omitted victim names, as well as race or ethnicity.  This was 
particularly true for second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter cases. 
In 2018, we employed seven Columbia University law students to search for 
missing victim names.111  The students were provided lists including defendant names, 
county, sentencing and offense dates, and case numbers.  We instructed them to find the 
missing names using internet search engines, online newspapers local to the underlying 
homicide, Westlaw, Lexis, the California Department of Corrections websites, and a 
compilation of San Francisco Homicides, 1849-1993 compiled by Kevin J. Mullen at the 
Ohio State University Criminal Justice Research Center.112  This effort identified missing 
victim names in 134 cases, leaving129 cases with no information on the name of the 
victim.    
With a more complete list of names, our next step was to estimate missing race by 
applying a verified and commonly-used method that assigns the probability of race or 
ethnicity using Census data.113  The Census Bureau used self-reported race or ethnicity 
                                                          
110  See Martin G. Urbina, A Qualitative Analysis of Latinos Executed in the United States Between 
1975 and 1995: Who Were They?, 31 SOCIAL JUSTICE 242, 247 (2004) (“Not all states keep race and 
ethnicity of inmates under a sentence of death, other than ‘whites’ and ‘blacks,’ and most states do not 
differentiate between the different Latino groups. Record-keeping methods also vary widely across states.  
As a result, information on Latinos, especially for specific Latino groups, is scant and unreliable.”). 
111  The Columbia law student researchers were Greg Bernstein, Melissa Castillo, Ed Costikyan, 
Andrew Howard, Mary Marshall, Olivia Morrison, and Andrew Pai. 
112  Available from the authors upon request.  
113  The current analysis used the 2010 Census surname list B.  See United States Census Bureau, 
“Frequently Occurring Surnames from the Census 2010, File B: Surnames Occurring 100 or more times,” 
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data to compile a list of over 160,000 surnames occurring 100 or more times from the 
2010 United States Census.  Combining these names with the self-reports of race and 
ethnicity, the Census Bureau computed the probability of a person living in the United 
States with that name being white, Black, Native American or Pacific Islander, Asian, or 
Latinx.114  Studies comparing this procedure with other algorithms for assigning race or 
ethnicity groups suggested comparably high accuracy, sensitivity, and positive predictive 
value when compared with self-reports.115 
For each of these racial or ethnicity groups, we coded these classifications at three 
levels of probability: 60%, 75%, or 90%.  There were no overlaps; that is, if a person 
whose name had a probability of 60% or more of being Latinx, they had no other 
probability above 60%.  Accordingly, that person was classified as Latinx.  We did the 
same for each of the other categories.  Persons whose names did not meet the 60% 
threshold for any of the population groups were coded as missing on the race/ethnicity 
                                                          
available at https://www2.census.gov/topics/genealogy/2010surnames/names.zip. 
  This method has been applied and accepted to identify Hispanic ethnicity in a 2013 case in the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona alleging racial discrimination under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Melendres, 07-CV-
2513, Dkt. 579 at 79 (May 24, 2013).  “Dr. Taylor’s statistics in this respect were, apparently, more 
sophisticated than those provided in the 1980 census list of Spanish surnames.” Id. at 79 n.69. “Dr. Taylor 
relied on independent U.S. Census data correlating the likelihood that a person with any given name self-
identified as Hispanic.  He did a differential analysis that focused particularly on names whose owners 
identified as Hispanic more than 90% of the time, more than 80% of the time, and more than 70% of the 
time.  He also included names whose owners self-identified as Hispanic at a 60% threshold as ‘a type of 
robustness analysis.’” 
114  Id. 
115  Francis P. Boscoe et al., Heuristic Algorithms for Assigning Hispanic Ethnicity, 8 PloS One, 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0055689  (2013).  See also, David L. Word et al., Demographic 
Aspects of Surnames from Census 2000, Unpublished manuscript, Retrieved from http://citeseerx. 
ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download (2008); Anurag Ambekar et al., Name-Ethnicity Classification from Open 
Sources, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 15TH ACM SIGKDD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KNOWLEDGE 
DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING 49-58 (ACM 2009), available at 
https://www3.cs.stonybrook.edu/~skiena/lydia/names.pdf; Mikhail Bautin & Steven Skiena, Concordance-
Based Entity-Oriented Search, 4 WEB INTELL. & AGENT SYS.: AN INT’L J. 303 (2009). 
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variable.  Our main estimates of race and ethnicity effects for defendant used the 60% 
classification threshold.  At this threshold, we reduced the rate of defendant missing race 
to 4% (81 cases).116  The other thresholds were used in sensitivity analyses. 
Even after undertaking this level of effort to identify the missing information, 
however, we continued to have 20% missing information for the race of victim (400 
cases), at the 60% confidence level.117  We evaluated the possibility of imputing the 
missing information but determined that the information is not missing at random.  Race 
of defendant and two special circumstances (multiple victims and gang membership) are 
statistically significantly related to the likelihood of missing the race of the victim.   
VI.  FINDINGS ON THE ROLE OF RACE AND ETHNICITY IN THE 
REACH OF SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
Table 2 presents the study sample and weighted universe by conviction (in rows) and 
race and ethnicity of the defendant (in columns).  The top row presents the sample 
overall, with the next three rows showing the distribution among first and second degree 
murder, and voluntary manslaughter cases.  Columns A, B, and C, show that Black, 
white, and Latinx defendants compose roughly equal and large portions of the sample, 
and combined account for 92% of the sample. 
  
                                                          
116  The 75% threshold yielded 9% missing (173 cases) and the 90% threshold yielded 14% missing 
(267 cases). 
117  The 75% threshold yielded 36% missing (686 cases) and the 90% threshold yielded 50% missing 
(965 cases). 
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Table 2.  Description of the Sample by Race or Ethnicity of Defendant and Conviction 
  A B C D E F 
  Black  White Latinx Other Missing Total 
Total Sample 26% 498 37% 696 28% 540 4% 80  4% 81 1,900 
 Weighted 30% 8,374 29% 7,873 33% 9,029 4% 1,177  3% 942 27,453 
M1  Sample 28% 212 39% 301 24% 184 4% 29 5% 36 764 
conviction Weighted 33% 2,896 31% 2,682 18% 2,336 5% 390 5% 362 8,711 
M2  Sample 21% 103 39% 192 30% 146 5% 26 5% 21 491 
conviction Weighted 26% 2,041 31% 2,429 35% 2,760 5% 397 3% 260 7,900 
VM  Sample 28% 183 31% 203 33% 210 4% 25 4% 24 645 
conviction Weighted 32% 3,436 25% 2,762 36% 3,934 4% 390 3% 320 10,842 
 
We next estimate the scope of the special circumstances identified in the California 
statute by race and ethnicity.  The results demonstrate how the California death penalty 
statute’s expansive special circumstances not only fail to meaningfully narrow death 
eligibility, but also do so in a manner that targeted defendants of some race or ethnicity 
differently than others.  Although many of special circumstances appear to apply evenly 
across race and ethnicity, we identified six, however, that appear to affect different races 
or ethnicities differently.  The analyses below focus on those six circumstances:  multiple 
victims,118 lying in wait,119 robbery/burglary,120 torture,121 drive by shooting,122 and gang 
membership,123 and identify racial and ethnic disparities associated with each.  
We base our conclusions on four levels of analysis presented in three sections.  
Section A presents the simple distribution of the cases in which each of the six special 
circumstances is found or present by race or ethnicity.  Section B focuses more sharply 
                                                          
118  Cal. Penal Code §190.2(3) (West 2019). 
119 Cal. Penal Code §190.2(15) (West 2019). 
120 Cal. Penal Code §190.2(17)(A) & (17)(G) (West 2019).  Although these two special 
circumstances may be separately charged and found, given the overlapping nature of the two, we combined 
them for the purposes of this Article. 
121  Cal. Penal Code §190.2 (18) (West 2019). 
122  Cal. Penal Code §190.2 (21) (West 2019). 
123   Cal. Penal Code §190.2(22) (West 2019). 
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on the risk faced by each race or ethnicity regardless of the number of cases in the study.  
The results report the percent of the total cases in each race or ethnicity in which each 
special circumstance is present or found.  Neither of these results consider the possibility 
that relative culpability of cases would explain the disparate application of the special 
circumstance.  Section C presents results of two sets of analysis in which we introduce 
culpability and time controls.  
Table 3.  Sample Distribution by Race and Selected Special Circumstances 
 (representation rate, number of observations, weighted count)  
 Special Circumstance Black White Latinx Other Unknown Total  
1. Representation in the 
Sample Overall 
30% 
498 
8,374 
29% 
696 
7,873 
33% 
540 
9,029 
4% 
80 
1,177 
4% 
81 
942 
 
1,900 
27,453 
2. Multiple Victims 
(p < .04)124 
24% 
25 
396 
34% 
55 
544 
23% 
32 
366 
10% 
6 
160 
9% 
10 
149 
 
128 
1,616 
3, Lying in Wait 
(n.s.) 
27% 
134 
2,188 
29% 
236 
2,363 
37% 
188 
3,014 
4% 
21 
289 
3% 
24 
244 
 
603 
8,098 
4. Robbery/Burglary  
(p < .01) 
43% 
160 
2,400 
26% 
166 
1,462 
24% 
97 
1,338 
3% 
16 
179 
5% 
17 
260 
 
456 
5,639 
5. Torture 
(p < .01) 
24% 
42 
570 
44% 
96 
1,027 
19% 
35 
455 
6% 
13 
150 
6% 
13 
132 
 
199 
2,334 
6. Drive by Shooting  
(p < .02) 
30% 
21 
365 
6% 
8 
71 
53% 
26 
633 
8% 
4 
99 
3% 
2 
35 
 
61 
1,203 
7. Gang Membership 
(p < .001) 
32% 
46 
990 
6% 
8 
199 
57% 
69 
1,756 
4% 
5 
125 
1% 
1 
27 
 
129 
3,097 
 
A.  Distribution of Cases in Select Special Circumstances by Race or Ethnicity 
Table 3 lists these special circumstances and presents the distribution of the cases in 
the sample and the weighted universe by race or ethnicity for each one.  The first line 
presents the overall distribution of cases in the sample from Table 2.  This distribution 
                                                          
124  The statistical significance value report the corrected weighted Pearson chi square statistic from 
STATA survey tabulate for each line of the table. [Note to editors:  This belongs at the bottom of the table.] 
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provides one useful point of comparison to the distribution of individual special 
circumstances in the remaining rows of the table.  Rows 2-7 present the distributions 
among cases where each special circumstance was present or found.   
Row 2 shows that white defendants represent 34% of the cases involving multiple 
victims,125 whereas Black defendants represent 24% and Latinx 23% of the cases.  The 
white defendant representation is higher than the white defendant representation in the 
study and statistically significantly higher than the representation of other race or 
ethnicities in the study (p < .04).  Row 5 shows a similar but greater disparity among 
cases in which the torture special circumstance was found or present.126  White defendant 
cases compose 44% of this population, compared to 24% of Black defendants and 19% of 
Latinx defendants.  The white defendant representation in cases where this special 
circumstance is present or found is more than twice that of Black and Latinx defendants, 
in contrast to the roughly equal representation in the study overall. 
Line 4 combines cases in which the special circumstance for robbery or burglary was 
found or present.127  Here, Black defendant cases represent a disproportionate share of the 
cases, at 43%, compared to 26% for white defendant cases and 24% for Latinx cases.  
Black defendants are overrepresented these felony murder cases in comparison to their 
representation in the study on line one (43% vs. 30%).  
Lines 6 and 7 present the most recent special circumstances, those marking cases 
                                                          
125  Cal. Penal Code §190.2 (a)(5) (West 2019). 
126  Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(18) (West 2019).   
127  Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17)(A) & (G) (West 2019). 
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involving drive-by shootings128 and gang membership.129  Latinx defendants represent 
more than one-half of the cases in which either of these special circumstances were 
present or found.  More precisely, Latinx defendants represent 53% of cases with 
evidence of a drive-by shooting and 57% of cases where the defendant was involved in a 
“criminal street gang.”  This substantial overrepresentation dwarfs the significantly 
underrepresented white defendants with a ratio of 8-9: 1 (57%/6% or 53%/6%).130   
B.  Rate at Which Select Special Circumstances are Present or Found by 
Defendant Race or Ethnicity 
Table 4 and Figure 1 present the unadjusted rate at select special circumstances are 
found or present controlling for race or ethnicity.  This “selection rate” provides a 
standard measure of the disparity between the frequency with which each race or 
ethnicity appears in the overall study and the frequency with which is present or found in 
each special circumstance.  The measurement of interest is the percent of the cases in 
each race or ethnicity is which a given special circumstance is present or found.  
Unadjusted means these findings do not take into consideration (or control for) the 
relative culpability of the cases.   
  
                                                          
128  Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(21) (West 2019). 
129  Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(22) (West 2019). 
130  The discussion and tables in the remainder of the paper present only weighted analyses for ease of 
presentation.  The complete table above provides a reference point to the size of the underlying sample and 
the importance of the weights. 
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Table 4.  Selection Rates:  Unadjusted Rate at Which Special Circumstances are Present 
or Found, by Defendant Race or Ethnicity131  
  Black White Latinx p-value 
  % n % n % N  
1. Multiple Victims  5% 396 7% 544 4% 366 < .04 
2. Lying in Wait  26% 2,188 30% 2,363 33% 3,014 n.s. 
3. Robbery/Burglary  29% 2,400 19% 1,462 15% 1,338 < .01 
4. Torture  7% 570 13% 1,027 5% 455 < .02 
5. Drive by Shooting  4% 365 1% 71 7% 633 < .01 
6. Gang  12% 990 2% 199 17% 1,756 < .01 
7. Totals  8,374  7,873  9,030  
 
Figure 1.  Application of Special Circumstance by Defendant Race 
 
 
Figure 1 presents the data in Table 4 graphically, showing three bar graphs for each 
special circumstance, one each for the selection rate for Black, white, and Latinx 
defendants.  The first set of columns presents selection rates by race and ethnicity for 
cases in which the multiple victims special circumstance was found or present.  The first 
column reports that 5% of Black defendant cases have this special circumstance present 
or found.  The second column reports that 7% of white defendant cases include this 
                                                          
131  Each line in the table reports the selection rate for each race or ethnicity (number of that race or 
ethnicity where the special circumstance was present or found divided by the total number of defendants of 
that race or ethnicity) as reported in a crosstab of the special circumstance and a race variable that 
separately coded Black, white, Latinx, other, and missing.  The total defendants by race or ethnicity are 
reported in line 7.  The p-value is based on the chi2. [Note to editors:  This could also go at the bottom of 
the table.] 
5%
26%
29%
7%
4%
12%
7%
30%
19%
13%
1% 2%
4%
33%
15%
5%
7%
19%
Multiple Victims Lying in Wait Robbery/Burglary Torture Drive by Shooting Gang
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special circumstance.  The third, reports that 4% of Latinx defendant cases have evidence 
that the multiple victims special circumstance was found or present.  The underlying 
number for each set of columns appears in Table 4. 
These selection rates do not take into account the culpability of the defendant in the 
case or the year the case originated.  They are unadjusted fractions.  Nonetheless, the sets 
of columns from left to right make clear that race and ethnicity matter.  Note that white 
defendants have the highest selection rate in the first line and first set of columns, present 
above, and in the fourth line and set of columns for the torture special circumstance 
finding.     
Black defendants have the highest selection rate in only the third line and third set of 
cases which combining cases with the felony aggravator for burglary and robbery.  Here 
Black defendants at 29% (2,400/8,374) face a rate almost twice as high of that Latinx 
defendants at 15% (1,338/9,030) and one and one-half times as high of that of white 
defendants at 19% (1,462/7,873).  This finding is consistent with the overrepresentation 
of Black defendants in cases with these special circumstances presented above.   
Latinx defendants face the highest selection rates in the remaining three sets of 
columns.  The fifth and sixth columns present selection rates for the drive-by shooting 
and street gang murder special circumstances where Latinx defendant cases represent the 
majority of cases.  Even when controlling for representation, these special circumstances 
affect Latinx defendants at a statistically significant higher rate than Black or white 
defendants.   
The drive by shooting special circumstance was present or found in 7% of Latinx 
defendant cases (633/9,030), compared to 4% of Black defendant cases (365/8,374) and 
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less than 1% of white defendant cases (71/7,873).  The street gang murder circumstance 
was present or found in 19% of Latinx defendant cases compared with 12% of Black 
defendant cases and less than 2% of white defendant cases (199/7,873).  
Finally, our earlier research showed the lying in wait special circumstance to expand 
the reach of the death penalty more than any other special circumstance.  The selection 
rates by race are closer for this special circumstance, but Latinx defendants again face the 
highest rate (33%), compared to 30% for white defendants, and 26% for Black 
defendants.132 
The analysis to this point suggested that the selected special circumstances 
applied disparately by race and ethnicity.  It remained possible, however, that disparity 
could be explained by the relatively culpability of different sets of cases.  The following 
analyses introduce culpability controls.   
C.   Controlled Analyses of Disparate Application of Select Special 
Circumstances by Race and Ethnicity 
The final section presents twodifferent methods of controlled analysis.  The first used 
logistic regression to control for alternate explanations, in this case culpability. The 
second uses what is commonly referred to as a “doubly robust” estimation.133  In both 
sets of analysis, we introduce a five-level race-purged culpability scale to control for the 
underlying facts in each case.134   
                                                          
132  We replicated the analysis presented above but limited the universe to factually first-degree 
murder cases.  While selection rates were slightly lower, the disparities remained constant. Similarly, we 
replicated the analyses using race of defendant estimates at the 75% and 90% thresholds and observed no 
meaningful differences. 
133 Greg Ridgeway & John M. MacDonald, Doubly Robust Internal Benchmarking and False 
Discovery Rates for Detecting Racial Bias in Police Stops, 104 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 661 (2009); Tamar 
Sofer et al., Control Function Assisted IPW Estimation with a Secondary Outcome in Case-Control Studies, 
27 STAT. SINICA 785-804 (2017), available at doi: 10.5705/ss.202015.0116. 
134  We created the culpability scale in a multi-step process.  The scaling process begins with by 
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For the first analysis, we specified a simple logistic model for each special 
circumstance identified to show disproportionate racial or ethnic application in our 
unadjusted analyses.  Logistic regressions provide estimates of the odds that a special 
circumstance will be found or present for a person of each race or ethnicity.135  Logistic 
regression is well-suited for analysis of dichotomous outcomes, such as selection into a 
specific category or program.  The results show the log odds and 95% confidence 
intervals of being selected into the category of interest, adjusted for the effects of other 
variables entered into the regression.  The odds ratio for each predictor is its 
exponentiated coefficient. 
The model defined the special circumstance as the outcome measure, and included the 
culpability scale, a fixed effect for offense year, three distinct race or ethnic variables 
(identifying Black defendants, Latinx defendants, and white defendants), and one 
variable identifying Black and Latinx defendants together.136  We also included a variable 
                                                          
producing a culpability index produced by a logistic model that produced a predicted probability of a death 
sentence for each case.  This model included variables for the fact of four special circumstances being 
present found or present [3 (multiple victims), 5 (for the purpose of avoiding arrest), 10 (witness victim), 
and 16 (victim race motive)], the number of special circumstances in the case, kidnapping, that defendant 
was not the killer, the presence of co-perpetrators, and a scale for the age of the defendant.  The model 
produced a predicted probability of a death sentence for each pre-Furman case.  Those cases were ranked 
according to those predictions and divided into a five level culpability scale.  We then estimated a racial 
disparity within each cell and combined those disparities to compute a weighted average of the disparities 
across all of the cells.  This was used to purge the race effects from the index.  Mantel-Haentzel is the 
procedure we use to create these overall estimates.  See Nathan Mantel & William Haenszel, Statistical 
Aspects of the Analysis of Data from Retrospective Studies of Disease, 22 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 719 
(1959) (establishing this method). 
135  See generally DAVID W. HOSMER JR, & STANLEY LEMESHOW, APPLIED LOGISTIC REGRESSION 
(2004); see also SCOTT MENARD, APPLIED LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS (2002) (discussing the 
assumptions of a logistic regression model and its difference from ordinary multiple (least squares) 
regression models). 
136  We evaluated the importance of controlling for county by replicating the analysis for Los Angeles 
County alone and the study without Los Angeles County cases.  Neither analysis produced meaningfully 
different results.  This is not surprising as the study design considered county carefully.  
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measuring the presence of at least one white victim in this analysis when possible.137  We 
then specified the model by removing any variable that was not at least marginally 
statistically significant in the model, starting with the variable the farthest from 
significance and stopping when all variables showed significance.  The culpability scale 
remained highly statistically significant throughout the analysis. 
Table 5.  Race Disparities by Special Circumstance, Controlling for Culpability (Each line presents findings 
from a separate logistic regression model with a single special circumstance as the outcome variable.) 
 A B C D E F G 
 Special Circumstance Freq.138 Race of 
Defendant 
Odds 
Ratio 
St. 
Err. 
95% conf. 
int. 
p-
value 
1. Multiple Victims  1,616 Latinx 0.4 0.20 (0.2, 1.1) = .10 
2. Lying in Wait  8,098 Latinx 1.6 0.30 (0.9, 1.9) < .02 
3. Robbery & Burglary  5,639 Black 2.2 0.42 (1.5, 3.2) < .01 
4. Torture  2,334 White 2.3 0.57 (1.4, 4.3) < .01 
5. Drive by Shooting (model 1) 1,203 Latinx & 
Black 
3.5 1.6 (1.3, 7.7) < .01 
6. Drive by Shooting (model 2) 1,203 Latinx 2.5 1.0 (1.2, 5.0) < .02 
7. Gang  3,097 Latinx 
Black 
7.8 
4.8 
2.9 
2.0 
(3.7, 16.2) 
(2.1, 10.8) 
< .01 
< .01 
 
Table 5 presents results from the analysis of each special circumstance in which at 
least one race variable remained in the fully specified model.  Column A lists the special 
circumstances.  These are the same special circumstances presented in the unadjusted 
analysis.  Column B presents the frequency with which each special circumstance is 
present or found in the study.  Column C presents the race or ethnicity of defendants 
found to face disparate treatment.  Column D presents the odds ratio for the extent of 
disparate treatment reported in Column C, and Columns E-G present measures of 
                                                          
137  This analysis set the missing information to zero.  Doing so undercounted the presence of cases 
with at least one white victim.  Even then, this analysis was only possible on a limited basis.  Recall that 
race of defendant and two special circumstances (multiple victims and gang membership) are statistically 
significantly related to the likelihood of missing the race of the victim.   
138  Frequency reports the number of cases in the estimated universe recorded as having this special 
circumstance found or present. 
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significance.  The results largely confirm the unadjusted findings. 
A number of special circumstances apply disparately by race or ethnicity, but not all 
point in the same direction.  The largest disparities concern the criminal gang member 
special circumstance in Line 7.  Both Latinx and Black defendants face a disparate 
exposure to this special circumstance.  A model of the likelihood that the gang member 
special circumstance would be found or present reported that Latinx defendants faced 7.8 
higher odds than other similarly situated defendants and Black defendants face 4.8 higher 
odds that other similar situated defendants even after controlling for culpability and year.   
Lines 5 and 6 reports two different models for the likelihood that drive by shooting 
special circumstance would be found or present.  In model one, the combined variable for 
Black and Latinx defendants faced odds 3.2 higher than the odds faced by similarly 
situated defendants of other race or ethnicities.  In the second, Latinx defendants alone 
faced odds 2.4 higher than similarly situated defendants of other race or ethnicity.  
Line 1 reports that Latinx defendants face less than half the odds of a having multiple 
victim special circumstance found or present than other similarly situated defendants.  
This finding is only marginally significant.  Line 2 shows, however, that by holding 
culpability constant it become clear that Latinx defendants face odds of having the 
special circumstance for lying in wait found or present that are 1.6 the odds of similarly 
situated defendants of other race or ethnicities (p < .02).  
Lines 3 and 4 report similar sized disparities by for different groups of defendants.  
Line 3, reporting on the felony special circumstance for robbery or burglary, reports that 
Black defendants face odds 2.2 times higher than the odds faced by other defendants.  
Line 4, reporting on the torture special circumstance, reports that white defendants face 
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odds 2.3 times higher than other similarly situated defendants. 
We conducted additional tests for discrimination in the application of the select 
special circumstances using four comparisons of race and ethnicity effects. These tests 
use a first model to predict “treatment” status, and a second model that predicts the 
outcomes based on the adjusted probability of “treatment.”  This is “doubly robust” 
estimation measures the contribution of each subject in one group, and that contribution 
is weighted for subjects in the second group by the inverse of its selection probability into 
the sample. 139  Here, race is regarded as a “treatment”, and the models estimate the 
effects of the treatment on being found or present for individual specific special 
circumstances.  The model applies Augmented Inverse Probability Weighting (AIPW) to 
estimate the two stages of the analysis.140 The estimates of disparities are shown as 
“average treatment effects” (ATE) for the differences in the probability of selection by 
race (or effect sizes) between the reference and test categories.141 
We estimate four models to identify specific forms of potential discrimination.  The 
first model compares the presence of special circumstances for white defendants 
compared to all other defendants.  The second compares white with Black defendants, 
                                                          
139  Greg Ridgeway & John M. MacDonald, Doubly Robust Internal Benchmarking and False 
Discovery Rates for Detecting Racial Bias in Police Stops, 104 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 661 (2009); Tamar 
Sofer et al., Control Function Assisted IPW Estimation with a Secondary Outcome in Case-Control Studies, 
27 STAT. SINICA 785-804 (2017), available at  10.5705/ss.202015.0116. 
140  Heejung Bang & James M. Robins, Doubly Robust Estimation in Missing Data and Causal 
Inference Models, 61 BIOMETRICS 962 (2005); see also Michele Jonsson et al., Doubly Robust Estimation 
of Causal Effects, 173 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 761 (2011); James R. Carpenter, Michael G. Kenward, & 
Stijn Vansteelandt, A Comparison of Multiple Imputation and Doubly Robust Estimation for Analyses with 
Missing Data, 169 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y: SERIES A (STATISTICS IN SOCIETY) 571 (2006). 
141  Alberto Abadie el al., Implementing Matching Estimators for Average Treatment Effects in Stata, 
4 STATA J. 290 (2003); see also Alberto Abadie & Guido W. Imbens, Large Sample Properties of Matching 
Estimators for Average Treatment Effects, 74 ECONOMETRICA 235 (2006); Keisuke Hirano, Guido W. 
Imbens, & Geert Ridder, Efficient Estimation of Average Treatment Effects Using the Estimated Propensity 
Score, 71 ECONOMETRICA 1161 (2003). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3354842 
48 
 
 
excluding other racial and ethnic categories.  The third compares white with Latinx 
defendants, excluding all others.  And the fourth compares white defendants to both 
Black and Latinx defendants, again excluding all others.  Each model estimates first the 
(inverse) probability of being white in this sample relative to the reference group (Others, 
Black, Latino, Black or Latino), and then the probability of being found or present for 
each factor.  The models also include as a parameter the culpability scale described 
above.142  Table 6 shows the results.   
Table 6.  AIPW Estimates of Race and Ethnicity on Charging or Finding of Specific 
Aggravators (ATE, SE, p) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 White-Others 
White-Black 
Only 
White-Latinx 
Only 
White-Black or 
Latinx 
Multiple Victims .009*** -.003 .018*** .011*** 
 (.002) (.002) 0.002 (.002) 
Lying in Wait .010* -.037*** -.029*** -0.002 
 (.006) (.007) (.007) (.006) 
Robbery/Burglary -.025*** .103*** .040*** .029*** 
 (.005) (.007) (.006) (.005) 
Torture .065*** -.060*** -.081*** -.071*** 
 (.004) (.005) (.004) (.004) 
Drive By Shooting -.049*** .035*** .061*** .047*** 
 (.002) (.002) (.003) (.002) 
Gang -.122*** .094*** .167*** .133*** 
 (.003) (.004) (.004) (.003) 
N 1,900 1,194 1,236 1,734 
Significance: * = p < .05, ** = p < .01. *** = p < .001  
Models 2-4 show effects compared to Whites.  All models estimated with fixed effect for 
offense year and the culpability scale as a covariate. 
 
For each of the special circumstances, the race- or ethnicity-specific model results 
vary depending on comparisons with specific subgroups of defendants.  For example, 
white defendants are more likely to have the multiple victim homicides special 
                                                          
142  See supra note 133. 
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circumstance found or present in each of the three race- or ethnicity-specific models.  For 
lying in wait, white defendants are less likely than Black defendants to have this special 
circumstance found or present, but more likely than Latinx defendants.  For torture, white 
defendants are more likely have the special circumstance found or present than others.  
But they are less likely to have this particular special circumstance found or present in 
subgroup-specific comparisons.  
Other special circumstances show patterns that reflect race-specific crime patterns.  
White defendants are less likely to have the robbery/burglary factor found or present, but 
the other models suggest that specific combinations of Black and Latinx defendants are 
more likely to be have this special circumstance found or present.  The same pattern is 
true for drive-by-shooting and gang crimes.  
We tested the sensitivity of the estimates in Table 6 to the inclusion of victim 
race, especially white victims.  In previous studies, estimates of charging and sentencing 
were sensitive to the inclusion of White victim parameters, with consistent evidence of a 
greater probability of death sentencing and charging in cases with White victims.143  This 
privileging of White victim cases extends to police investigations of potentially capital-
eligible murders.144  To test the sensitivity of the estimates in Table 6 to the inclusion of 
White Victim effects, we re-estimated those regressions adding that parameter. The 
results were nearly identical.  Parameter estimates changed only at the third decimal 
                                                          
143  See Catherine M. Grosso, Barbara O’Brien, Abijah Taylor & George Woodworth, Race 
Discrimination and the Death Penalty, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: 
REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 540 (James R. 
Acker, Robert M. Bohm & Charles S. Lanier eds., 3d ed. 2014) (reviewing the literature). 
144  Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Police, Race, and the Production of Capital Homicides, 24 
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2019). 
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place, and significance remained unchanged.145  
The results overall confirm the heterogeneity of the application of special 
circumstances.  This in turn suggests that models that examine non-special circumstance-
specific racial disparities are likely to mask statistically significant disparities by race and 
ethnicity.  A rich analysis of racial and ethnic disparities can only accurately identify 
disparities though a similar attention to disaggregation and decomposition of death-
eligibility. 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
This Article examined whether the overbreadth of California’s death penalty 
statute results in disproportionate death eligibility by race and ethnicity.  We found that 
individual special circumstances disproportionally target defendants by race or ethnicity 
even after controlling for case culpability and other relevant factors.  This targeted and 
disparate application of the death penalty statute corresponds to Justice William 
Douglas’s reasoning for striking down the death penalty statutes in Furman.  He 
concluded, “it is ‘cruel and unusual’ to apply the death penalty … selectively to 
minorities whose numbers are few, who are outcasts of society, and who are 
unpopular.”146  
In particular, we found that the most recently added special circumstances for 
                                                          
145 Data available from the authors. 
146  408 U.S. at 245.  Justice Douglas cited a host of statistical analysis finding that race had a 
significant role in the imposition of death sentences.  See, e.g., id. at 249-50 (quoting the 1967 President’s 
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, which found that  “The death sentence 
is disproportionately imposed, and carried out on the poor, the Negro, and the members of unpopular 
groups.”); id. at 250 n.15 (quoting Professor Hugo Bedau’s conclusion that “Although there may be a host 
of factors other than race involved in this frequency distribution, something more than chance has operated 
over the years to produce this racial difference”); id. (citing Professor Marvin Wolfgang and his colleagues’ 
findings that racial basis affected the sentencing and execution of defendants in 439 death cases from 1914-
1958). 
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gang membership and drive by shootings fulfill the predictions of previous scholars who 
raised concerns that they would legislate “vengeance” rather than culpability147 and ran a 
risk of being “easy to apply to minority defendants.”148  The stereotype of Latinx 
defendants as dangerous “has a longstanding and stubborn cultural life” in the United 
States.149  Indeed, the patterns of lynching in the American South were present for Latinx 
people in California during the same decades.150  These special circumstances run the risk 
of providing legitimacy and the actions that follow to those stereotypes.   
We also found that the sweep of felony murder special circumstances for robbery 
and burglary,151 as well as the notoriously broad special circumstance for lying in wait152 
applied disproportionately to Black and Latinx defendants.  Finally, the torture special 
circumstance applies disproportionately to white defendants.   
These special circumstances play significant roles in the implementation of capital 
punishment in California.  The Death Penalty, a report prepared for the California 
                                                          
147  Jonathan Simon & Christina Spaulding, Tokens of Our Esteem: Aggravating Factors in the Era of 
Deregulated Death Penalties, in THE KILLING STATE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN LAW, POLITICS, AD 
CULTURE 96 (Austin Sarat ed., 1999). 
148  Id. at 100.  
149  Benjamin Fleury-Steiner & Victor Argothy, Lethal ‘Borders’: Elucidating Jurors’ Racialized 
Discipline to Punish in Latino Defendant Death Cases, 6 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 67, 77 (2004) (citing 
Diego O. Castro, “Hot Blood and Easy Virtue”: Mass Media and the Making of Latino/A Stereotypes, in 
IMAGES OF COLOR, IMAGES OF CRIME 135 (Coramae Richey Mann & Marjorie S. Zatz eds., 1998); Ruben J. 
Garcia, Critical Race Theory and Proposition 187: The Racial Politics of Immigration Law, 17 Chicano-
Latino L. Rev. 118 (1995); Gadalupe T. Luna, Beyond/Between colors: On the Complexities of Race: The 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and Dred Scott v. Sandford, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 691 (1999); MIRANDÉ, 
ALFREDO, GRINGO JUSTICE (1987). 
150  John Mack Faragher, Eternity Street, supra note 61. 
151  See Steven F. Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The California Death Penalty Scheme: Requiem for Furman, 
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1283, 1321 (1997) (describing and illustrating the “sweep of the robbery and burglary 
special circumstances). 
152  See Furman at 45, supra note 7, at [mss. p. 53 at note 122] (reporting that a “major contribution to 
[the California statute’s] over breadth is California’s lying in wait (LIW) special circumstance”); Shatz & 
Rivkind, supra note XX, at 1322-23 (noting the lying in wait special circumstances makes “most 
premeditated murders potential death penalty cases”).   
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Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice, reports the statutory basis for every 
person receiving a death sentence in California between 1977 and 2007.153  Two of the 
six special circumstances found to have disparate application—robbery and multiple 
murders—are the two most frequently used special circumstances in cases that resulted in 
a death sentence during the Commission’s study period.  Robbery was at least one of the 
special circumstances in 48% of the death sentences studied.  Multiple murder was found 
in 41% of the cases.  Burglary was third most frequently found at 22%.  
In addition, according to the Commission’s report, five of the six special 
circumstances identified here as targeting defendants by race or ethnicity have provided 
the sole basis for California death sentences.154  Multiple murders appeared as the only 
special circumstance in the case 118 times or in 36% of the cases in which it appears as a 
special circumstance.  Robbery appears alone in 91 cases, or 24% of the cases in which 
found, burglary in 10 (6%), torture in 13 (24%), and gang membership in 1 (25%).155   
This article demonstrates that the California death penalty statute is not only 
unconstitutionally broad but also “cruel and unusual” in its selective and targeted 
application.  Rather than mitigating the influence of race, it seems—at least in part—to 
have codified the underlying stereotypes and perhaps given them a venire of legitimacy. 
Although courts in the past have relied on evidence across a range of statutory 
aggravators in responding to claims of Eighth Amendment violations, research that 
demonstrates disparity by race across aggravators may well have masked strong 
                                                          
153  Ellen Kreitzberg, The Death Penalty, California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice 
(Jan. 7, 2008) at 32, tbl. d1. 
154  Id. 
155  Id. 
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disparities for specific aggravators.  Showing the extent and specificity of the sources of 
disparities and the populations affected, and knowing the stereotypes activated by many 
of these aggravators, could lead to different conclusions about the extent and nature racial 
and ethnic disparity, and a different path for litigation about discriminatory intent to 
challenge these statutes.    
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